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FAMILY FIRMS, PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY AND THE GREAT CRISIS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE ITALIAN CASE 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyses how Italian family firms have acted during the global great crisis in 
comparison to their nonfamily counterparts using a sample of almost 4,500 firms for 2007 and 2010. 
We study whether family control affects labour productivity, labour costs and competitiveness and 
how family and non-family firms have responded to the great crisis. Furthermore, we test whether 
the adoption of performance-related pay (PRP) for employees offers an efficacious strategy to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis. Quantile regression techniques have been used to test the 
heterogeneous role of PRP and its possible endogeneity has been taken into account in the empirical 
investigation. After the outbreak of the crisis, the distance in terms of the competitiveness of family 
firms (FFs) in relation to their nonfamily counterparts increased. However, we also find that family 
firms may take advantage of the adoption of incentive schemes, such as PRP, to encourage 
commitment and motivation from their employees more than nonfamily firms do. The positive role 
of PRP on labour productivity, coupled with a moderate influence of these schemes on wage 
premiums, enables them to regain competitiveness. In addition, for FFs located in industrial districts 
in which social rules prevail on formal rules, the adoption of PRP has exerted additional positive 
effects under hostile pressures, such as those characterizing the strong global crisis. 
  
1. Introduction 
 
Empirical research on the dispersion of productivity across firms has paid limited 
attention to the role of family firms (FFs), although a vast literature has shown that these firms 
are the predominant form of business worldwide (Westhead and Howorth, 2006). 
Furthermore, whether FFs are better performing in terms of labour efficiency than their non-
family counterparts is still open to debate (Bart, et al. 2005; Barbera and Moores, 2013). 
Different views and contrasting empirical findings have signalled a clear tension 
between two opposing perspectives. The first perspective signals the positive effects of being 
a FF, hypothesizing that FFs have more concentrated ownership and more incentives for 
active control of management (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). It also suggests that owners who 
intend to pass their business to family members have a potentially longer-term horizon with 
respect to other shareholders and thus a greater propensity to invest in long-term projects, 
which could enhance productivity (Martikainen, et al. 2009). A second view underlines the 
predominance of negative effects, arguing that family owners are mainly interested in 
pursuing the private benefits of control and that FFs are often characterized by dynastic 
management, causing low quality leadership and labour inefficiency (Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007; 2011; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013). To date, however, most of the available literature 
only refers to normal market conditions, whereas it could be relevant to analyse how the 
systematic differences between FFs and non-family firms (NFFs) may change in times of 
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crisis and whether FFs’ potential disadvantages are amplified (supporting the inefficiency 
argument) or reverted (in line with the FFs resiliency hypothesis). 
We contribute to the available literature analysing how FFs have performed in terms of 
labour productivity, labour costs and competitiveness during the great global crisis in 
comparison to their non-family counterparts. Additionally, we study how performance-based 
rewards, which are seen as one of the most important drivers of employees’ behaviour (Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2011) in the literature on labour productivity and human resource 
management practices (HRM), have differently affected the labour efficiency of FFs and 
NFFs. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to shed light on a comparative 
analysis of the performances of family and non-family firms in Italy and the interplay of 
incentive pay before and during the crisis. No formal theory offers clear predictions on these 
issues, and the exploratory nature of the current study does not allow us to offer conclusive 
answers to our research questions. However, we propose an articulated body of ideas that 
supports the empirical investigation. In addition, we apply econometric methods to mitigate 
the problems undermining the identification of causal effects and obtain a number of useful 
insights. 
The theoretical framework that provides clearer hypotheses for our study is offered by 
the socio-emotional wealth (SEW) theory. The SEW theory helps to explain why FFs behave 
distinctively and is founded on the notion that family principals make decisions that are not 
only driven by economic logic but also aim to preserve the stock of affect-related value that 
they derive from their family business (Gomez-Meja et al., 2007). While non-economic aims 
may also be present in NFFs, they are particularly important in FFs. Indeed, protecting SEW 
and its multiple dimensions, such as family control and identification with the firm, firm 
reputation, the perpetuation of the family dynasty and long-term social ties, may explain 
differences between FFs and NFFs, as well as across different FFs. In our study, we propose 
the SEW approach to address four research questions. 
In the first step, we start by asking to what extent family ownership contributes to 
explaining firm differentials in productivity, compensation and competitiveness in the Italian 
economy, a country characterized by a very high proportion of family businesses, persistent 
interfirm productivity differentials and, since the second half of the 1990s, feeble productivity 
that collapsed in 2008 with the great crisis. We find that FFs suffer more from labour 
productivity and competitiveness gaps with respect to NFFs and that the presence of 
controlling families is not valuable for firm productivity. 
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In a second step, we question whether adverse shocks contribute to these differentials 
and study the influence of family and non-family corporate ownership on firm responses to a 
strong external shock, such as the great crisis. The results we obtain suggest that in cases of 
adverse shocks, FFs respond more slowly, likely because they often care more about their 
reputation among employees and avoid layoffs, thus obtaining reduced productivity. 
Then, in a third step, we test whether this negative crisis effect may be mitigated by 
managerial strategies such as the adoption of collective and/or individual performance-related 
pay (PRP). From our database, we know that PRP schemes are based on both group and 
individual performance even though we have no separate information on these two types of 
PRP. The SEW view suggests the distinctiveness of human resource management (HRM), 
which includes PRP as a tool to enhance labour productivity. This view predicts differences 
between FFs and NFFs (Cruz et al. 2011). We empirically address this point and find that the 
incentives alignment mechanism, such as PRP, acts as an important moderating factor and 
that FFs adopting PRP schemes are better off.  
Finally, we ask in a fourth step if embeddedness in a business ecosystem, such as an 
industrial district, affects these results. It is likely that when FFs operate in a context in which 
social norms, webs of relations and tacit rules prevail over formal rules, their desire to 
continue the family dynasty and preserve firm reputation in the community is an asset and not 
a liability (Naldi et. al. 2013). We investigate the relevance of these arguments, verifying 
whether the embeddedness of FFs in an industrial district enhances the efficacy of wage 
incentives. 
To design our empirical strategy, we take into account that variations in strategies and 
performance among FFs may be large and even larger than the variations between family and 
non-family forms of organization (Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez & Wolfenzon, 2010; Chua et 
al. 2012). Potential sources of heterogeneity among FFs may be related to a variety of 
economic and non-economic goals and governance structures, such as the different degrees 
of involvement of family members in top management teams (Chua et al. 2012). Given these 
wide heterogeneities, we adopt quantile regression techniques to investigate whether 
heterogeneities between FFs and NFFs, and within FFs, contribute to explaining the wide 
dispersion of productivity and competitiveness recorded in the Italian economy. Also, when 
we introduce as key regressor a time varying variable (PRP), we take into account the potential 
biases due to unobserved factors that affect family (and nonfamily) firms by adopting a 
quantile regression model with fixed effects (Canay, 2011). Finally, we check for the possible 
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endogeneity of PRP by means of instrumental variable quantile regression techniques 
(Amemya, 1982; Abadie et al., 2002).  
The Italian context is an ideal setting to verify whether the family organizational form 
plays a role in explaining heterogeneity in responses to strong adverse shocks. As said, Italy, 
characterized by the high prevalence of FFs, experienced a collapse of labour productivity 
in 2008, in contrast with other European economies that managed to maintain a stable level 
of labour efficiency (Bugamelli et al. 2018). Additionally, the Italian reforms in industrial 
relations, started with the proposal of 22 January 2009, strongly focused on restoring firm-
level productivity growth by favouring firm-level wage bargaining and the diffusion of wage 
incentives, such as PRP, whose efficacy is analysed in this paper. 
We study the Italian case by taking advantage of a unique source of firm-level data, 
the employer and employee survey (Rilevazione su Imprese e Lavoro, RIL) conducted by 
the National Institute for Public Policy Analysis (INAPP) in 2007 and 2010 on a 
representative sample of Italian firms operating in all private non-agricultural sectors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature of our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the data used and descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 describes the econometric framework employed and our estimation results. Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2.Theoretical background  
2.1 Overall literature-based conceptual framework  
The four different steps structuring our study call for a unified and internally consistent theory 
that logically links them. As stated above, we intend to i) compare the economic performances of FFs 
and NFFs; ii) study whether these potential differences increase during crises; iii) show how incentive 
compensation strategies such as PRP may alleviate the FF productivity gap, especially in the group 
of firms that become worse off and iv) explore whether the specific business environment in which 
the family business is embedded, such as the industrial districts in the Italian case, influences the 
relationship between PRP and economic performance.  
A short summary of the family firm literature indicates that family ownership involves potential 
benefits and costs, as widely discussed in a number of comprehensive overviews (see, among others, 
Anderson and Reeb, 2003, Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Thus, FFs may exert opposite influences on 
firm productivity, as discussed by Barth et al. (2005). In terms of advantages, it is argued that 
concentrated ownership characterizing FFs reduces agency costs because large shareholders have the 
incentive and power to control and discipline their managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), thus 
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exerting a positive influence on productivity. Furthermore, owners who intend to pass their business 
on to family members may have a longer term horizon than other shareholders. Thus, concentrated 
ownership provides FFs the incentive and knowledge to focus on core competencies, ensuring that 
firm capabilities will evolve in a cumulative trajectory and enhancing the firm’s competitive 
advantage (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006). In terms of disadvantages, the limited diversification 
of risk due to concentrated ownership may discourage the adoption of new technology that entails 
more uncertain effects but that could boost productivity performance. In addition, owners of FFs are 
mainly oriented towards pursuing the private benefits of control that may be in clear contrast with the 
efficient management of the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Recently, Shukla et al. (2013) and Berrone et al. (2013) emphasized the importance of a new 
theoretical framework, SEW, that integrates specific aspects of FFs previously studied by various 
strands of literature, such as agency theories, institutional approaches, stewardship and stakeholder 
management views. This new theoretical framework has proven to be valuable for predicting 
differences in the strategic choices between FFs and NFFs (Naldi et al. 2013), and the research 
questions we propose can be supported by the SEW framework, as explained below. 
First, the SEW model suggests that the distinctive trait of family principals is their desire to 
preserve socio-emotional wealth (Gomez-Meja et al. 2007), which is defined as the stock of affect-
related value that they derive from their family business (Gomez-Meja et al., 2007) or, in other terms, 
the non-economic satisfaction derived from firm ownership (Berrone et al. 2012). Adopting a 
behavioural agency view and borrowing from prospect theory, the SEW approach indicates that for 
family principals, loss aversion regarding their socio-emotional endowment is more important than 
the desire to maximize future economic gains (Berrone et al. 2012). This means that FFs adopt 
rational behaviours that could lead to their economic under-performance with respect to non-family 
counterparts, as found in many empirical studies.  
Multiple dimensions characterize SEW, such as the close identification of family owners with 
their firm (which often carry the family name), preservation of family control and influence over the 
business, also through dynastic succession, family image and community reputation, and the 
emotional attachment of firm members1. These different SEW priorities influence leadership style 
and likely shape owners’ behaviours and outcomes. For instance, on the one hand, FFs prefer to invest 
in long-term projects because family owners are motivated by a desire to support the long-term 
continuity of their firm, thus increasing chances of firm survival (see, among others, Le Breton-Miller 
                                                 
1 Berrone et al. (2012) suggest that SEW is composed of five interrelated dimensions, summarized under the 
FIBER label: family control and influence (F), identification with the firm (I), binding social ties (B), 
emotional attachment (E), and the renewal of family bonds (R). F refers to the utilities family members receive 
from exerting control and influence over the business. 
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& Miller, 2006). On the other hand, the dimension of family control and influence explains why 
principals may be reluctant to select non-family managers and prefer a top management team that is 
more protective of SEW, even though family management actions are decoupled from firm 
performance. This point is coherent with a number of studies according to which FFs are less 
productive than non-family-owned firms when their management regime is characterized by family 
members rather than by talented professional managers (Barth et al., 2005; Bloom and Van Reenen, 
2007). In the first step of our analysis, we will verify that under the hypothesis that family principals 
are usually not driven by an economic logic but by a desire to preserve SEW, it is plausible to expect 
that FFs underperform compared to NFFs. 
Second, firm responses to an economic crisis are also a function of how much importance the 
family owner places on reputation and the achievement of social aims apart from any economic gains. 
The SEW model incorporates the ideas discussed within the stakeholder and stewardship views 
(Davis et al. 1997) and explains that family members and family managers pursue aims benefiting all 
stakeholders and rationally behave as stewards of their employees to preserve SEW.  The SEW 
dimensions including strong identification of family owners with the firm, the importance of firm 
image and interest in the firm’s social responsibility are coherent with the social identity theory 
advocated by Block (2010). This identification renders family owners more interested in firm 
reputation and leads them to avoid actions such as deep job cuts that damage the image of the firm, 
leading to a greater reluctance to downsize in relation to NFFs, as found by Bassanini et al. (2013). 
However, in terms of productivity, this reluctance hampers restructuring processes and reduces 
efficiency. Partially in line with these hypotheses, Neckebrouck et al. (2017) show that owners may 
represent “good employers”, at least as “financial” stewards of their employees, as indicated by the 
lower dividend pay-out and higher investments observed for a sample of Belgian FFs. On the other 
hand, according to the same authors, family owners are worse “organizational” stewards than non-
family owners because they offer lower compensation, invest less in employee training, and exhibit 
higher voluntary turnover and lower labour productivity. Furthermore, the concept of “social 
recognition”, very close to the idea of firm reputation and family image of the SEW model, explains 
why Italian FFs have been more reluctant to downsize during the 2008-2009 recession compared to 
NFFs, as shown by D’Aurizio and Romano (2013). Indeed, the former internalize more than the latter 
the social pressure exerted by the community of stakeholders residing in the geographical areas in 
which FFs are located.  
In summary, it is plausible to expect from the discussion above that FFs underperform in times 
of crisis because they do not want to reduce jobs, and this choice negatively affects labour 
productivity compared to NFFs. Notice, however, that other studies question this safeguarding-jobs-
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based explanation. For example, Lins et al. (2013), using a sample from 35 countries for 2008–2009, 
find that the under-performance of FFs is higher mainly because they cut investment more, relative 
to other firms, and take actions to preserve their control benefits. Therefore, this point deserves 
additional evidence to identify whether the ultimate reasons for the under-performance of FFs during 
a crisis can actually stem from FFs’ aims of safeguarding jobs and preserving workers’ commitment 
and loyalty. 
Third, it is plausible to ask whether the negative effect of FFs during crises may be mitigated 
by managerial strategies such as the adoption of PRP. The rich survey of Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2011) has looked at the strategic role HRM plays in labour productivity, particularly performance-
based rewards, such as PRP. The question in our analysis is also whether the potential beneficial 
effects of these pay schemes are contingent upon family and non-family aims and leadership style, as 
signalled by Firfiray et al. (2016). 
The dimension of emotional connection predicted by the SEW approach between family owners 
and their firm permeates the entire organization (Cennamo et al., 2012) and influences their HRM 
practices, such as wage incentive strategies (Cruz et al. 2011). Concerning crises, Bauweraerts (2013) 
found that family involvement plays a positive role, likely because the importance given to SEW 
during previous stable periods provides FFs with a competitive advantage in terms of a less 
formalistic view of the organization. This attitude has enhanced flexibility to cope with unexpected 
events such as the global financial crisis.  
However, FFs are normally less likely to adopt incentive pay because this type of payment is 
less important according to the SEW framework. As known, agency theory predicts that the adoption 
of PRP may produce both incentive and sorting effects, making incumbent workers more productive 
but also attracting the most able workers from outside (Lazear, 2000). Concerning this second effect, 
the SEW model argues that family owners are interested in the compatibility of hired workers “with 
the organization’s core philosophy and a poor compatibility is difficult to remedy upon selection” 
(Cruz et al., 2011, p.189). The reliance on the ‘person-organization’ fit as opposed to the ‘person-job’ 
fit does not need competence requirements and does not call for wage incentives to select employees 
with greater abilities. In addition, when employees enjoy greater employment security, they may 
prefer their more protected position at the cost of lower earnings. Finally, HRM competences in 
designing reward systems to motivate incumbent workers are important and require professional 
practices. In FFs, which are typically smaller and have fewer resources than NFFs, the high-level 
technical competences needed to implement incentive systems are often not affordable. Hence, as 
documented by some empirical studies, FFs show a lower tendency to rely on formalized recruitment 
systems and performance appraisals (Cruz et al., 2011). However, there will be circumstances under 
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which a pay policy based on implicit and non-monetary incentives may not be enough to guarantee 
satisfactory firm performance and firm survival, especially during adverse shocks. Indeed, the SEW 
view does not reject the argument that FFs adopt business strategies driven by economic motives. As 
suggested by Shukla et al. (2014, p.107), “there is a tipping point between the opposite forces of 
economic and affective motivations, and FFs are able to realize when it is absolutely imperative to 
use an economic frame of reference to make a decision as opposed to an affect driven decision”. Of 
course, the opportunity to introduce a PRP scheme could equally affect FFs and NFFs, but for FFs, 
this opportunity would be particularly interesting because they can exploit the importance of family 
firms’ social relationships, i.e., the reciprocal bonds within family businesses that the SEW view calls 
the dimension of ‘binding social ties’ (Berrone et al., 2012). This could work both for FFs 
implementing collective bonuses and for FFs that decide to introduce only individual pay incentives. 
As for collective bonuses, by embedding some aspects of social capital theory (Arregle et al., 2007), 
the SEW view suggests that family organizational capital is founded on a climate of industrial 
relations that encourages loyalty, cooperative attitudes, self-control and fairness. Thus, if collective 
PRP bonuses in NFFs may induce employees to free-ride on the efforts of others and thus reduce 
productivity (Prendergast, 1999), in FFs, the characteristics of social capital (Coleman, 1990; Bubolz, 
2001) allow families to operate more as a team. This is particularly true when the SEW aims are more 
oriented towards a “sense of belonging” rather than towards control (Cennamo et al. 2012, p. 1155). 
In such a context, family business SEW priorities influence organizational aspects such as trust 
formation and strengthen relational trust; hence, the actions of family owners towards stakeholders 
are more altruistic and less calculative. We suggest that these attitudes induce reciprocity and 
cooperative behaviour from their employees. 
Regarding individual bonuses, the literature on incentives (Lazear, 2000) shows that in the 
presence of heterogeneous workers, individual PRP schemes favour positive sorting effects; i.e., they 
help attract high-ability employees, who are expected to positively influence firm efficiency and 
prefer contingent rather than fixed rewards. Chrisman et al. (2017, p.120) pointed out that in normal 
circumstances, FFs suffer from adverse selection. This means that higher quality employees 
systematically sort themselves out of the labour market for FFs because these firms often pursue non-
economic goals and favour family employees. In such a case, non-family employees will expect that 
they will not be adequately compensated. Thus, it is likely that the best workers will apply to work 
in NFFs, where their opportunities for higher wages and career advancement are less limited. 
However, if FFs decide to adopt PRP, they send a signal about their priorities, suggesting their 
intention to attract highly skilled workers. By contrast, in NFFs, which have no biases in favour of a 
group of employees, the problem of attracting the best workers is less severe, and the benefits of PRP 
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are not great as they are in FFs. Consequently, as suggested by Chrisman et al. (2017), it is likely that 
PRP schemes increase the productivity of FFs more than that of NFFs. 
In summary, under great uncertainty in market demand and potential losses that might call into 
question the survival of the firm, FFs may be induced to adopt a decision, such as collective and 
individual PRP, that is motivated more by economic rationale than by affective utility2. In such a 
case, thanks to the greater efforts made by employees who share a sense of belonging (solution to the 
free riding problem), or thanks to individual PRP, which signals firm intention to attract highly skilled 
workers, we can observe a positive reversal in in FF performance when compared with NFFs.  
Concerning the specific link of PRP with the crisis, we recall that in the personnel economic 
literature, few studies analyse the possibility of firm liquidation and its implied incentives for workers 
instead of managers. Two opposite views are raised. Generally, if a company is facing a crisis, 
workers may lose their jobs. In the first view, the perception of job insecurity during such a 
downsizing process involves prolonged uncertainty and may have detrimental consequences for 
employees’ attitudes and performance (Hartley et al. 1991). These behavioural consequences have 
been confirmed by the meta-analysis of Sverke et al. (2002) that indicates that perceptions of threats 
to continued employment have important empirical negative associations with employees’ job 
attitudes toward their organizations.  
It can be also conjectured that these negative effects occur because the risk of firm bankruptcy 
is perceived to be completely exogenous and unambiguously reduces incentives. The second view, 
modelled in a theoretical framework by Krakel and Nienen (2015), shows that in a severe crisis 
scenario and when the probability of collective dismissal is endogenously determined by workers’ 
choices concerning effort, workers perceive that firm liquidation can only be avoided if they are 
successful and the survival threshold that avoids firm termination is met. Hence, in a poor economic 
situation, in which a firm has a likelihood of liquidation, employees try to guarantee the firm survival 
rather than give up or free ride. In such a case, there is a team problem that could be better tackled by 
FFs thanks to the family organizational capital, as discussed above.  
The embeddedness in business ecosystems would affect these results because the team problem 
and effort responses to PRP during a crisis may be more often characterised by complementary 
reactions to PRP when FFs operate in an industrial district as discussed below.  
                                                 
2 Notice that in the Italian two-tiered bargaining regime, under positive demand shocks, firms may distribute 
PRP wage premiums linked to firm results at the second level of bargaining. This wage component is added 
to the base wage, set in the first level, and could be zero when firms do not gain positive results. Thus, risk-
averse employees may also accept these agreements, because employees do not take any extra risks. Firms, on 
their part, especially if they have experienced a high degree of volatility in the past, would be more willing to 
adopt PRP schemes as a strategy to obtain higher employee performance and successful outcomes. 
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Indeed, as fourth dimension, the SEW approach by incorporating institutional theory view also 
underlines the importance of the alignment of corporate and societal values for FFs (Berrone et al., 
2014), which sustains the dimension of family image and contributes to explaining how business 
contexts influence the effectiveness of incentive schemes such as PRP. Naldi et al. (2013) have shown 
that the preservation of SEW may be conditioned by the firm environment. They found that different 
environmental conditions influence the way SEW-preserving mechanisms affect firm results. Their 
estimates for the Italian case show that when FFs are embedded in specific business ecosystems, such 
as an industrial district, SEW represents an asset. For instance, a family CEO in these business 
contexts prefers to recruit people from the local labour market who share the same values and cultural 
heritage (Becattini, 1990). Thus, the preservation of SEW, which involves a concern for reputation 
and a long-term perspective, might increase collaboration and reciprocity within FFs operating in 
industrial districts. This occurs because in these local communities, the employees of FFs are less 
likely to respond with actions oriented to ‘gaming’ the compensation system than are employees of 
NFFs.  
Lazonick (2005) pointed out that in the industrial districts, the alignment of interests and aims 
among family CEOs, employees and the rest of the local community emerges from the specific social 
conditions of the FFs operating in those contexts3. The regional concentration of small FFs 
encourages a vertical specialization and strong links between users and suppliers along the industry’s 
supply chains. Not only are firms owned and managed by the same people, but very often in the 
industrial districts, former craft and skilled workers spin off from firms in which they were employed 
and become entrepreneurs. In addition, the regional collective institutions (local governments, 
universities and other public research centres) strongly support this local economy and share its 
entrepreneurial view.  
During a crisis and when the weakest firms fire part of their workforce, dynamic adjustment 
mechanisms may be facilitated by labour mobility that is relatively strong in industrial districts. In 
these areas, the costs of switching firms following displacement are relatively low because workers 
are specialized within various phases of production of the same specific industry and possess 
‘industry-specific’ skills. The high mobility of skilled labour across firms is the base for the 
accumulation of specific contextual knowledge and the diffusion of technological externalities 
(Becattini, 2002; Brusco, 1982). The globalization and the diffusion of ICT even strengthened these 
effects because in a market and technological setting subject to frequent and rapid change, the creation 
                                                 
3 Few studies provide empirical evidence on employment dynamics in districts, as noticed by Muscio and 
Scarpinato (2007), although the district literature has shown the key role of human capital in districts’ 
competitiveness. The authors have documented that, over the period 1991–2001, Italian district firms offered 
(at least before the crisis) better labour conditions in terms of labour opportunity and wage levels.   
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of a specific production identity, the process of integrating contextual knowledge and reciprocal 
learning may even be more valuable (Dei Ottati, 2017)4. Since industrial districts are forms of 
business organization characterized by the prevalence of small companies, usually family owned, the 
positive aspects triggered by the implementation of PRP in FFs discussed above could be amplified 
in these areas. The agency problem of the adverse selection of FFs, which are less capable of 
recruiting the best possible workforce than NFFs are, may be mitigated by wage incentives. PRP 
schemes signal to potential employees of FFs that performance, and not kinship, will be rewarded. 
After an adverse shock, when some companies go into crisis and respond by dismissing employees, 
firms that perform better may absorb these redundancies, and PRP schemes may produce positive 
sorting effects. In industrial districts, which typically are systems that allow social and economic 
mobility, significant positive productivity gains may be obtained by FFs. 
Based on the discussion thus far, first, the SEW framework allows us to verify whether FFs, given 
the greater importance attached to non-economic goals discussed above, underperform in terms of 
productivity when compared to NFFs. Implicit contracts and strong social relations with their 
employees allow FFs to pay lower wages, but their lower labour costs might not offset their 
productivity gap with respect to NFFs. Therefore, FFs also underperform in terms of competitiveness 
when compared to NFFs.  
Second, we want to analyse whether the negative gap of FFs in terms of economic performance 
(productivity and competitiveness) amplifies during the recent crisis. This is because the interest in 
preserving the family image and family members’ identification with the family name makes FFs 
more reluctant to restructure and downsize.  
Third, collective and individual PRP schemes might reduce the negative gap in productivity 
between FFs and NFFs. This is because the implementation of these schemes in FFs could benefit 
from family organizational social capital, accumulated within a climate of industrial relations that 
encourages loyalty, cooperative attitudes, self-control and fairness and simultaneously reduces free 
riding from the employee side when collective incentives schemes are implemented. Furthermore,  
individual PRP incentives might favour positive sorting effects and mitigate the adverse selection that 
normally affects recruitment in FFs. Notice that the adoption of PRP schemes causes an increase in 
labour costs in both FFs and NFFs. This is a corollary of the reasoning developed above and a 
prediction for the potential effects of PRP on labour costs. Furthermore, the reluctance of FFs to 
                                                 
4 “In a market and technological setting subject to frequent and rapid change, it is vital to be part of an 
environment that is rich in knowledge where information, including non-codified information, circulates by 
virtue of socio-economic interaction. Such an environment facilitates reciprocal learning and the creation of a 
specific production culture and identity” (Dei Ottati, 2017, p. 274). The biomedical, mechanical engineering, 
leather tanning and footwear, and sportswear districts (Mirandola, Reggio Emilia, Santa Croce sull’Arno, 
Montebelluna), are notable examples of Italian districts that have adapted to the new context. 
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dismiss workers negatively affects their possibility to reduce labour costs during the crisis. However, 
our conjecture is that the influence of PRP on FFs’ productivity is effective only if it counterbalances 
these negative effects on labour costs and positively boosts competitiveness more than it does in 
NFFs. 
Finally, we investigate whether the embeddedness of FFs in an industrial district enhances the 
efficacy of PRP because of the stronger alignment of the firm and societal values. This process could 
even amplify the positive sorting effects mentioned above and reduce adverse selection problems in 
the labour market for FFs. Therefore, the favourable influence of PRP on productivity and 
competitiveness, predicted above for family owned firms, should increase in these areas. 
 
2.2 Family firms, heterogeneity and quantile regression 
The economic literature has widely discussed differences in the rate of technology adoption, 
exposure to international markets and organizational routines that affect the basis of firms’ 
capabilities and behaviour as factors underlying the marked heterogeneity across firms (Teece et al. 
1994; Becker, 2004; Dosi et al. 2012). However, in recent years, increasing attention has been paid 
by the family business literature to those additional sources of heterogeneity that lead to different 
capabilities and decisions of FFs, with negative and positive implications for overall firm 
performance (see Bertrand and Schoar, 2006, for a review). The mix of economic and non-economic 
goals discussed within the SEW framework help us to better explain why the within-FF heterogeneity 
becomes relevant when attempting to distinguish FF performance from that of NFFs. Additionally, 
the different ways FFs prioritize the multiple SEW dimensions have great importance, so that “family 
firms represent a highly heterogeneous group”, as emphasized by Cennamo et al. (2012, p. 1166). 
For instance, some SEW dimensions are not always valuable for firms’ competitive advantage, 
especially when they mean retaining control and the renewal of family bonds to the firm through 
dynastic succession; by contrast, other dimensions such as the enjoyment of family influence over 
the firm, reputation and family image may be valuable dimensions. From a related perspective, Pittino 
et al. (2018) recently showed that varieties of entrepreneurial orientation among FFs are conditioned 
by different degrees of belongingness and self-identity that tie family and non-family members to 
ownership, “regardless of the presence of enforceable property rights” (Pittino et al. 2018). In more 
general terms, the different weights given by family owners to economic and non-economic goals 
and, within the non-economic goals, to different dimensions of SEW make FFs a much more 
heterogeneous group than NFFs, other firm characteristics being equal, i.e., size, sector, workforce 
composition. These considerations also lead many authors to avoid studying FFs as a single 
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homogenous group to be contrasted with NFFs in comparative studies (Cennamo et al., 2012; Chua 
et al., 2012).  
Unfortunately, both the mix of economic/non-economic factors relevant to the firm’s decision 
making and the importance given to the different dimensions of SEW are not observable 
characteristics in our empirical investigation because we only have information on family ownership 
and management of the firm (that is, we have a binary variable for FFs). In addition, our binary 
variable for FFs is not time varying, and in the first two steps of our empirical analysis, we cannot 
exploit the short panel data structure of the database. Therefore, we try to restore heterogeneity among 
the FF group by assuming that other firm characteristics being equal, the distribution of labour 
productivity, labour costs and competitiveness is shaped by the different importance FFs place on 
SEW and single SEW dimensions.  
Quantile regression is a useful tool for studying the effect of being FFs along the distribution 
of performance. First, we study the effect of being FFs along labour productivity, labour costs and 
competitiveness distributions to determine whether potential negative gaps in performance between 
FFs and NFFs emerge more frequently among the highest performing firms or only amid the poor 
performers. Should a greater disadvantage emerge among the highest performing firms, we would 
conclude that there are probably not bundles of SEW dimensions in Italy that allow FFs to perform 
better and simultaneously reduce the gap with NFFs. In addition, a larger gap in the upper tail of the 
performance distribution would mean that the dominance of FFs among the population of Italian 
firms, is a serious obstacle to the overall improvement of productivity and competitiveness in the 
national economy. Second, we investigate whether changes in the gaps observed along these 
distributions occur after the outburst of the crisis. Finally, we analyse whether the introduction of 
PRP shows different impacts depending on the position of FFs along the same distributions. In this 
case, the time-varying nature of PRP allows us to use a quantile regression model with fixed effects 
(Canay, 2011). 
 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data 
The empirical analysis is based on micro-level data drawn from the Employer and Employee 
Surveys (RIL) conducted by the National Institute for Public Policy Innovation (INAPP) for the years 
2007 and 2010 on a representative sample of partnerships and limited liability firms operating in the 
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non-agricultural private sector5. The INAPP-RIL surveys collect a unique set of information about 
employment composition, personnel organization, industrial relations and other workplace 
characteristics. In 2010, the survey also obtained information about corporate governance, 
ownership/control and management structure. This information enables us to distinguish between 
FFs, in which a single family holds the majority of shares or has direct control of the firm, and NFFs, 
in which the majority of shares are not owned by a single family6.  
Each wave of the RIL questionnaire collects information about whether a firm-level bargaining 
agreement has been adopted. Such firm-level agreements in Italy cover, among other issues, PRP 
(i.e., wage bonuses linked to the enterprise’s performance). Since the presence of some type of PRP 
scheme (collective and/or individual) is an item with a good response rate in the RIL questionnaire, 
we created our variable of interest as a dummy variable, i.e., the presence/absence of PRP7.  
In addition, we have a large set of firm-level information concerning firm size and firm 
strategies (hiring, innovation and export), the composition of the labour force by occupation 
(executives, blue-collar workers and white-collar workers), gender, type of contract (fixed-
term/permanent) and training activities. We also control for the sectors and regions (NUTS 1) and 
use the industrial district dummy variable as a proxy of the specific business context, as discussed in 
the previous section. 
To link the information above to indicators of firm efficiency and competitiveness, a sub-
sample of the RIL dataset was merged with balance-sheet information from the AIDA archives. The 
AIDA data provide information on our dependent variables, that is, the (log of) valued added per 
employee and the (log of) labour costs per employees. From their difference, it is possible to compute 
an indicator of competitiveness8.   
                                                 
5 The availability of information for only two years is a limitation of our research. Nevertheless, our data make 
it possible to have short panel data and go beyond cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, the two years at our 
disposal allow us to consider periods before and during the crisis. Thus, our investigation takes into account 
all changes that occurred within this interval. 
6 The FF group may be divided into two sub-groups: firms in which a single family holds the majority of shares 
and family members run the firm (FMs) and firms in which a single family holds the majority of shares and 
external professional managers run the firm (FNMs). In our sample, FMs account for more than 90% of total 
FFs. The results we obtain for firms with family management are not significantly different from those 
obtained for the whole group of FFs (these results are available upon request). Thus, we decided to maintain 
only the main distinction between family and non-family firms. 
7 The literature focusing on relationships between incentive schemes and economic performances identifies 
other human resource management practices (HRMP) that complement PRP. For instance, Bloom and van 
Reenen (2011) consider self-managed teams, performance feedback, job rotation, regular meetings, and 
training besides the incentive pay. In our case, the RIL questionnaire only reports information with good 
response rates for PRP and training. Notice also that investigation on complementarities of HRMP poses 
important challenges on both economic and econometric terms (Bloom and van Reenen, 2011, p. 1724) and 
calls for a deeper investigation which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
8 Labour costs include taxes on labour and represent a standard measure for calculating competitiveness. 
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We have also drawn from AIDA archives data on past firms’ sales (period 1998-2005). 
Following Devicienti et al. (2018, p.180), we calculated the standard deviation of eight years of firms’ 
sales as a proxy of volatility and uncertainty on the product market. We consider the volatility at the 
firm level and transform this information into a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm 
experienced volatility above the median volatility of the correspondent two-digit Nace sector and 0 
otherwise9. This dummy variable is the instrument used in the instrumental variable quantile 
regression (Abadie et al, 2002), introduced as a robustness check (see Appendix B.2 and B.3 for more 
details). 
With regard to sample selection, we excluded firms with fewer than five employees to retain 
only those productive units characterized by a minimum level of organizational structure, for which 
it makes sense to test the role of PRP. Furthermore, we excluded firms that experienced mergers and 
acquisitions in the previous three years to limit the analysis to enterprises whose ownership and 
control structure remained unchanged during the observation period. Therefore, the sample that we 
used in the first specifications was an unbalanced panel of approximately 4,476 firms for 2007 and 
4,336 for 2010.  
Detailed definitions of all variables mentioned above are reported in Table A1 (Appendix A) 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for FFs and NFFs before and after the outbreak of the crisis.  
Over the period 2007-2010, on average, FFs were less successful in terms of labour productivity, 
paid lower wages, and their competitiveness indicator (ln (P/LC)) was more unfavourable. In addition, 
FFs employed fewer executives and white-collar employees, made less use of training, were less active 
than non-family enterprises in product innovation, and, with regard to their workforce, had a lower 
proportion of men and a higher percentage of fixed-term contracts. 
However, our major interest is to investigate the disparities in the responses of FFs and NFFs to 
the global financial recession. We start with our key variable, the diffusion of PRP. 
Insert Table 1 
It appears that the incidence of agreements on PRP was modest before the crisis and that a 
smaller fraction of FFs adopted these schemes (8%) in relation to NFFs (26%). These differences are 
in line with other evidence and confirm that in FFs, which are typically smaller and have fewer 
resources than NFFs, recourse to high-level technical competence for implementing incentive systems 
is often not affordable (Cruz et al. 2011). In 2010, these different propensities towards PRP were still 
remarkable and reflected the different possibilities of bearing the high cost of implementation of these 
                                                 
9 Devicienti et al. (2018) construct measures of the economic volatility faced by firms and unions based on 
past sales at the sectoral level, whereas we use data for past sales at the firm level.  
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schemes, especially in times of crisis. However, likely as result of the reform proposal of 22 January 
2009 that designed new rules for wage setting to amplify the importance of the variable component of 
wages, both groups slightly increased their recourse to PRP (9% and 29% in FFs and NFFs, 
respectively). Interestingly, these changes were accompanied by an increasing proportion of trained 
employees, which increased in FFs from 20% in 2007 to approximately 25% in 2010. A significant 
increase of trained employees was also recorded in NFFs (from 28% to 35%). Furthermore, we 
observe a slight decline of fixed-term contracts in FFs from 10% in 2007 to 9% in 2010 and in NFFs 
from 9% to 7%, respectively. These tendencies towards training and fixed-term contracts confirm that 
in Italy, as in other European countries, during the crisis, firms try to protect the human capital 
embodied in skilled blue-collar and white-collar workers. These organizational changes are confirmed 
by other employee characteristics. For both groups of firms, we observe slight changes in the structure 
of the workforce in terms of occupational categories. The need to retain human capital led to an 
increase of shares of executives and white-collar employees and a parallel decline of blue-collar 
employees. These results are in line with the evidence obtained by the ESCB’s Wage Dynamics 
Network (WDN) for Italian firms with more than 20 employees (D’Amuri et al., 2013).  
For firm productivity, the major change observed after the crisis was the greater reduction of 
labour productivity in the FF group (in log from 10.80 in 2007 to 10.75 in 2010), whereas for NFFs, 
labour productivity was stagnant (the reduction in log was from 11.02 in 2007 to 11.00 in 2010). 
These tendencies were coupled with a general substantial sluggishness of real labour costs. As a 
result, the decline of competitiveness (ln (P/LC)) demonstrated by FFs before and after the outbreak 
of the crisis was slightly higher (from 0.43 in 2007 to 0.38 in 2010) in relation to NFFs (from 0.47 to 
0.44). 
The strong decline of process and product innovation recorded in both groups of enterprises is 
remarkable. However, for the year 2010, the number of FFs and NFFs that weathered the crisis by 
relying on international markets increased, thus demonstrating the role of the increase in the number 
of exporting (family and nonfamily) firms as a strategic response to compensate for the contraction 
of domestic demand.  
Concerning the longitudinal structure of our dataset, Table 2 shows the summary statistics of 
between and within variation for both dependent variables and our key regressor, that is, PRP. 
Although the variation across firms is always more important than the within variation, the latter is 
not negligible and supports our choice to use a fixed-effects method when our variable of interest is 
PRP.   
Insert Table 2 
4. Econometric strategy and results 
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4. 1 Methods 
To investigate econometrically the role of family ownership and PRP across productivity, 
labour costs and competitiveness distributions before and during the great crisis, we proceed in four 
steps. 
In the first and second steps, we estimate the factors behind the (log of) value added per 
employee   ln (
𝑃
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
   by using the following equation: 
(1) 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
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)
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𝜀𝑖,𝑡     𝑡= 2007,2010 
where subscripts i and t are firms and years, respectively, is the (log of) physical capital 
per employee, and DFF represents a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is owned 
and/or controlled by a family and zero otherwise. Crisis is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for 
the year 2010 and 0 otherwise, whereas 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝐹   is an interaction term. The parameter associated 
with DFF indicates whether firms owned/controlled by a family are more or less productive than NFFs 
are. Put differently, the coefficient associated with DFF may be interpreted as the labour productivity 
gap between the two categories of firms, whereas the interaction term 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝐹   captures potential 
changes in this gap during the crisis. The vector Fit denotes controls for workforce composition and 
other firms’ characteristics discussed in section 3.1 (for more details, see Table A.1 in the Appendix). 
The parameter s denotes sector-specific fixed effects, j denotes regional (NUTS1_level) fixed 
effects for macro-areas, and  is an error term capturing the idiosyncratic component of labour 
productivity. 
We replicate this strategy when the dependent variables are labour costs (
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 where subscripts i, t and the control variables included in the right-hand side of equations (2) 
and (3) are the same as those used for labour productivity.  
itL
K






ln
it

 18 
In the econometric framework formalized above, we rely mainly on quantile regression (QR) 
methods and maintain OLS estimations as a benchmark to explore whether FFs show different 
behaviour compared to NFFs along the different points of the productivity, labour cost and 
competitiveness distributions. As discussed in section 2.2, firm characteristics (labour force 
composition, size, sector of economic activity, innovation and export) being equal, the presence of 
unobservable factors such as managerial capabilities and a different mix of economic and 
noneconomic (SEW) goals for FFs justify the analysis of relationships of interest across conditional 
quantiles rather than conditional means. In particular, we use a Koenker and Basset (1978) estimator 
to verify i) whether the gap between FFs and NFFs (𝛽 ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝐹,𝑖,𝑡) differs along quantiles of productivity, 
labour costs and competitiveness distributions (see H1) and ii) whether this gap changed during the 
crisis (𝛿 𝐷𝐹𝐹,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) over different quantiles (see H2).  
In the third step, we explore the effect of PRP along the distributions of the same dependent 
variables by distinguishing the sub-group of FFs from that of NFFs. Using the same notation 
introduced above, we estimate the following equations:  
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where PRP is a dummy variable indicating whether an incentive pay scheme is adopted, the 
interaction term (𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∙PRP) aims to capture whether the effect of PRP changed during the crisis 
(H3), and F is a vector that includes other controls for firm characteristics and workforce composition. 
In this case, the time-varying nature of PRP leads us to take into account all time-invariant unobserved 
factors at the firm level that could bias the PRP coefficient. Therefore, we perform quantile fixed-
effects estimates and apply the technique elaborated by Canay (2011), in which the unobserved 
individual heterogeneity is proxied by additive fixed effects that capture time-invariant firm 
characteristics (for more details, see Appendix B.1).  
To test the fourth hypothesis discussed in section 2, which refers to the effects of PRP in 
industrial districts, we simply add an interaction term (𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∙PRP ∙ District) and respective 
combinations of lower-level effects ((𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 ∙District) and (PRP ∙ District)) to equations (4)-(6). 
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Finally, the issue of potential endogeneity is taken into account. It may be argued that the 
adoption of PRP requires high-quality personnel policies and is more likely to be affordable for top-
performing firms with high-level efficiency. Thus, higher-productivity firms may have a higher 
probability of adopting a PRP scheme, and potential self-selection problems might emerge. 
With respect to our estimation strategy, we use two methods: i) the Quantile Treatment Effect 
Estimator of Abadie et al. (2002) (IVQR_AAI) and ii) the traditional Two-Stages Least Absolute 
Deviation Estimator (IVQR_2 LAD) of Amemya (1982). A detailed explanation of these two 
methods is reported in Appendix B.2 and B.3, respectively. 
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Family ownership and economic outcomes 
Table 3 reports the pooled OLS and quantile regression results for equation (1).   
Insert Table 3 
To begin with mean regressions, we note that a negative correlation between family ownership 
and labour productivity is amplified during the crisis. In particular, OLS estimates indicate that FFs 
suffer from a labour productivity gap of almost 12%, whereas the crisis contributed to this difference 
with an additional impact of approximately 7% (see the OLS coefficient associated with the 
interaction term Family firms∙ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠). OLS regressions for labour costs (equation 2) indicate a 
negative estimate for the dummy Family Firms (8.6%), although no significant effect is associated 
with the interaction term Family firms∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠. Focusing on equation (3), OLS estimates for 
competitiveness, reported in Table 5, suggest that the gap of FFs in relation to NFFs becomes negative 
and significant with the crisis, as shown by the coefficient associated with the interaction term Family 
Firms*Crisis, whereas no direct significant impact is exerted by family ownership (see the coefficient 
for Family Firms). Specifically, in 2010, a -0.05 in log value is the difference of FFs in terms of 
competitiveness. This figure exceeds the unadjusted Ln(P/LC) difference-in-difference (family-
nonfamily_2010 minus family-nonfamily_2007), implicitly deduced from Table 1, and thus signals 
that FFs were seriously hit by the 2008 crisis10.  
Our interpretation is that FFs, which usually do not want to breach the implicit contract with 
their employees because their reputation is at stake (Block, 2010), avoid opting for layoffs in the case 
of adverse shocks, with the consequence of side effects on labour productivity. This interpretation 
does not always hold for FFs in all countries, as we discussed in section 2.1. For example, Lins et al. 
                                                 
10 By taking the competitiveness indicator (Ln(P/LC)) from Table 1, we see that the decline for FFs from 0.43 
to 0.38 minus the decline for NFFs from 0.47 to 0.44 is -0.05-(-0.03)=-0.02. Family involvement contributed 
to this average value by -0.05, whereas it is likely that other firm characteristics counterbalanced this negative 
influence. 
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(2013) investigated family firm performance during the 2008-2009 crisis in 35 countries and found 
that their under-performance is due to preserving private benefits of control and cutting investments 
rather than reducing the dismissal of workers. For this reason, we provide additional evidence, based 
on Italian family firms, to support the conjecture that FFs preserve implicit contracts with their 
employees and restructure less during the crisis. Following Lins et al. (2013), we study differences 
between FFs and NFFs in terms of aggregated (firm level) labour costs, employment and net 
employment growth rates before and during the crisis11. Table A.2, in the Appendix, shows that 
compared to NFFs, FFs employ fewer workers on average (- 7.8%) and bear lower costs for labour 
(-16.4%) in normal times; however, these figures do not change (i.e., the negative gap does not 
amplify) during the crisis. In addition, we observe a reversal of the net employment growth rate, the 
indicator that captures the effects of the restructuring and downsizing of firms during the crisis. 
Although net changes in employment are slightly more favourable for NFFs (that is, a negative gap 
of -3.6% is observed between FFs and NFFs), the opposite holds during the crisis, when a positive 
difference of 13.8% emerges between the same two groups. On average, FFs tend to dismiss fewer 
workers than NFFs during the crisis12. 
To complete the picture presented by the OLS estimates, we note some controversial results for 
two control variables for women and innovation. The negative estimates associated with women are 
coherent with other studies that find that female employees, on average, prefer activities that allow 
greater flexibility between job and family, have lower interdependence with other workers, are less 
involved in participative work forms (Zwick, 2004), and appear less responsive to incentives. Notice 
also the non-significant results of process and product innovations on labour productivity, which 
could be due to the probable high correlation between export and innovation propensities, all of which 
are included as control variables in our estimates13.  
Going beyond a mere conditional mean model and turning to the quantile regressions, we obtain 
meaningful results. For labour productivity, Table 3 reveals that the coefficient associated with the 
FF dummy confirms the insight obtained with OLS estimates but also suggests that the point estimates 
                                                 
11 We have no information to test behavior in the pursuit of private benefits of control and investment cuts, an 
aspect that is out of the scope of the current investigation. Instead, we can evaluate the effects of the crisis on 
labour costs, employment and net employment growth (NEG). The latter has been identified according to the 
standard procedure we find in literature (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Boeri, 1996), that is NEG=(Et - Et-1) / 
[(Et + Et-1)/2], where E is employment. In our case, we calculated NEG between 2006 and 2007 and between 
2009 and 2010. 
12 The conditional mean of the predicted value of the net employment growth rate (see the NEG formulation 
in the previous footnote) is slightly positive in 2007 (0.80% for NFFs and 0.77% for FFs) and, of course, 
negative in 2010 (-1.42% for NFFs and -1.27% for FFs). In any case, it is less worse for FFs. 
13 The coefficient of Export is significant with the expected sign in both the productivity and competitiveness 
equations.  
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differ widely across the various quantiles14. The best performers demonstrate a major penalty in terms 
of labour productivity (LP) when owned by families (-21.4%), whereas for the group located at the 
median position and at the 10th percentile, the penalties of FFs in relation to NFFs are significantly 
lower (-9.3% and -8.5%, respectively).  
With regard to labour costs, we note that the best performers in terms of labour productivity 
(Q90) pay low wages (-8%) in relation to the corresponding NFFs (see Table 4). However, for this 
quantile (Q90), the distance in LC estimates of FFs from NFFs is not significantly different from that 
recorded by the firms located at the bottom of the distribution (the coefficient associated with FFs for 
the Q10 is -10.8%)15. As a result, we find that FFs located at the top of the distribution present a 
significant gap in terms of competitiveness (ln (P/LC) of -12.7 points in log values in relation to 
NFFs. This gap is significantly higher than that recorded by firms located in the nearest position 
(Q75), for which the penalty of FFs in relation to NFFs is significantly lower (-7.5 in log values)16 
(see Table 5). By contrast, for FFs located at the bottom of the distribution no negative gap concerning 
competitiveness has been found. 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 
In sum, heterogeneities are more marked for labour productivity, whereas for labour costs, 
likely as a result of more uniform and compressed wage strategies, differentials between FFs and 
NFFs across the different quantiles are less evident. Therefore, the best-performing FFs, those with 
high labour productivity and competitiveness, likely have a better mix of SEW dimensions that 
renders them high performant within the group of family firms, as we conjectured in section 2.2, but 
at the same time they are more distant in terms of the same performances from their NFF peers. In 
other words, corporate ownership (FFs vs NFFs) may be an important source of heterogeneity and 
the best performers seem to contribute more to this heterogeneity as they are more penalized than 
firms located at the bottom of productivity and competitiveness distributions. These results, in 
conformity with what found by Barbera and Moores (2013) and Firfiray et al. (2016), suggests that 
as FFs grow in size and obtain higher economic performances with respect to smaller FFs, also record 
a higher gap in terms of labour productivity with respect to their NFF counterparts. Especially Barbera 
and Moores (2013), demonstrated that differences in the efficient use of inputs between FFs and NFFs 
may explain this evidence. As discussed above, the binding social ties and genuine concern for 
                                                 
14 For the coefficients associated with FFs, we find that Q50 vs. Q90 and Q10 vs. Q90 are significantly different 
at the 0.01 level. 
15 The differences of the quantile coefficients for FFs are only significantly different at the 0.05 level for Q10 
vs Q50. 
16 As shown by Table 5, the quantile coefficients associated with FFs for Q10 vs. Q90 and Q75 vs. Q90 are 
significantly different at the .01 level and at the 0.10 level, respectively. 
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employee welfare make the output contribution of labour much more important than returns on capital 
in FFs. Therefore, a best-performing FF that necessarily introduces more capital than low performer 
FF in its production organisation, suffers more from lower output contribution of capital, compared 
to the output contribution of capital in NFFs. This explanation for the best performers and 
heterogeneity among FFs adds to that we discussed on different performances between FFs and NFFs, 
i.e., elements of SEW that shape managerial orientations, firm strategies and differences in the 
efficient use of inputs are likely behind the weaker productivity and competitiveness of FFs compared 
to NFFs.  
However, the crisis shows a much less clear-cut impact along the distributions of economic 
outcomes discussed above. Our results from quantile regressions reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 signal 
that only the FFs located on the median and those just below the median (25th percentile) suffered 
more from the crisis in terms of both productivity and competitiveness. Therefore, the OLS results 
are basically driven by firms with an intermediate level of performance. By contrast, for FFs located 
at the top of outcome distributions, the largest negative gaps they already show before the crisis in 
productivity (-0.214) and competitiveness (-0.127) do not further worsen during the crisis17.  
 
4.2.2. Performance-related pay, family ownership and the crisis 
 
As seen, the attention given by FFs to reputation and trust-related relationships with employees 
may restrain some FFs from intensive downsizing during adverse times and may lead to labour 
hoarding. This choice is undertaken at the cost of reducing labour productivity and enlarging their 
competitiveness gap during crises. How can they fill this gap? Are high-road approaches to 
managerial strategies an efficient way to survive and close the distance from firms owned by outsiders 
and run by professional managers? How do FFs use these strategies, such as PRP, to face a crisis? 
We attempt to answer these questions below. 
In this section, the relationship between PRP and our dependent variables is investigated by 
performing the quantile fixed-effect regression proposed by Canay (2011). As discussed previously, 
this technique enables us to disentangle the differentiated impact of PRP across the distributions for 
both subsamples of FFs and NFFs from other sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity at 
the firm level (see Tables 6 and 7). 
Insert Tables 6 and 7 
                                                 
17This evidence does not fully confirm for the whole outcome distributions our conjecture of the poor 
performance of FFs, which worsens during the crisis due to their reluctance to downsize. Further research is 
needed on this issue, also supported by longer data series, to obtain conclusive results.  
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Given our focus on the role of PRP with a main concern for the year of crisis, we present only 
the related estimated coefficients for PRP, the variable Crisis (that is, Year 2010) and their interaction. 
We do not comment on the results for the other covariates included in our empirical models (these 
results are available on request).  
Similar to the specifications presented in Tables 3-5, we report the results for the conditional 
mean function, obtained through the standard within estimator (FE), as a benchmark. The findings 
for the FFs subsample indicate that the FE coefficient for PRP has the expected sign but is not 
significant, whereas we find that PRP plays a positive and statistically significant role in productivity 
along the whole distribution, as signalled by the quantile coefficients (Table 6). The remarkable 
differences underlined in the literature between mean and quantile regressions can explain this 
apparent incongruity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Normally, quantile (and median) regressions are 
more robust to outliers, rely on approaches that avoid assumptions about the parametric distribution 
of regression errors and are especially suitable for heteroskedastic data.  
Concerning the economic interpretation, the result obtained with the quantile regression is in 
accordance with the hypotheses of a vast body of related literature on PRP that has shown that these 
contingent rewards generate beneficial effects in the form of higher effort and work quality, higher 
commitment and incentives to firm-specific human capital, greater workforce cooperation in facing 
organizational changes, lower labour turnover and longer average tenure (Prendergast, 1999). 
Interestingly, these efficiency arguments apply for FFs but not for NFFs (see Table 7). This finding 
supports the hypothesis that only family-involved firms, in terms of both ownership and active 
management, tend to exploit some of the advantages of incentive pay schemes, which in our case 
include both collective and individual bonuses. As discussed in section 2.1, economic theory is 
ambiguous on their impacts, especially if these schemes involve collective bonuses that may induce 
employees to free-ride on the efforts of others and cut productivity. By contrast, the implementation 
of PRP in FFs may present some advantages given that family businesses feature socio-emotional 
values and more identity than non-kinship firms do (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Furthermore, in FFs, 
interpersonal relationships show more stability and a shared social network (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). These trust-related relationships help to reduce the opportunistic behaviour that may arise in 
firms ruled by professional managers and owned by nonfamily principals. In addition, FFs might 
benefit from positive sorting effects of PRP that solve structural problems of adverse selection 
intrinsic to the specific nature of family owned firms and their priority to preserve SEW. 
It is relevant to note that the crisis significantly affects the labour efficiency of FFs, with a range 
of values along the distribution from -5.6% (Q75) to -9.2% (Q10) as indicated by the coefficients 
associated with the dummy Crisis (see Table 6, Panel A). However, our results also suggest that the 
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crisis does not decrease the positive relationship between PRP and the labour productivity of FFs. For 
all but the median quantile (Q50), the coefficients associated with the interaction term PRP*Crisis are 
not significantly different from 0, thus confirming that the crisis did not attenuate the positive 
relationship between PRP and the labour efficiency of FFs. This can also be deduced by the positive 
algebraic sum of the significant coefficients for PRP and PRP*Crisis in quantile regression (see panel 
A of Table 6). Thus, for instance, for the best performers (Q90) in 2010, the association of PRP with 
productivity was quite close to the value +8.5% (the estimated coefficient for PRP). 
The gains in competitiveness FFs obtained from PRP in all quantiles deserve attention (Table 6, 
Panel C). Notably, these gains are invariant with the outbreak of the crisis. Indeed, with the exception 
of firms in the Q50 and Q75 positions, the role of PRP in 2010 is not significantly different from the 
positive mean value, which is + 0.052 points in log value. Notice also that the coefficient for the best 
performers (0.049) is not significantly different from that obtained for the firms in Q75 (0.058) and 
Q50 (0.052). This finding implies that FFs that link pay to performance may encourage motivation 
and elicit more effort from their employees, with a gain in competitiveness amounting to +0.05 points 
in log values that exactly offsets the losses suffered from the crisis (see Table 5, the coefficient 
associated with Family Firms *Crisis in the OLS column). This gain allows FFs to partially recover 
the gap in relation to their NFF counterparts, as we conjectured in our conceptual framework. 
Endogeneity 
The positive effects of PRP on productivity, labour costs and competitiveness are also confirmed 
by quantile regressions that take into account treatment effect techniques to tackle the likely 
endogeneity of PRP (see Appendix B.2 and B.3). Tables A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix show that PRP, 
instrumented by lagged sales volatility, positively affects productivity, labour cost and 
competitiveness only in the group of FFs. Table A.5 shows the relevance of the instrument (High Sales 
Volatility) in the first stage of the Instrumental Variable 2 Stages Least Absolute Deviation regression 
(IVQR_2 LAD).  
 
4.2.3 Performance-related pay, family firms and industrial districts  
As hypothesized in section 2.1, an additional factor that may contribute to the positive role of 
PRP on labour productivity and competitiveness, in accordance with the approach based on SEW, is 
the business context in which FFs operate. One typical characteristic of the Italian economy is the 
geographical concentration of specialized firms that are agglomerated in industrial districts. For FFs 
operating in these business contexts, the performance gap with respect to NFFs may revert, as shown 
by Naldi et al. (2013). This occurs because the preservation of SEW positively influences the 
alignment of the firm’s aims with those of the local community, fostering adherence to the norms of 
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conduct and tacit rules prevailing in the district. Under these circumstances, we expect that the 
implementation of PRP schemes, especially in times of crises, may produce prompt and positive 
responses if firms’ objectives and business practices properly fit the requirements of the local 
environment. On the one hand, sorting effects might be more effective because FFs in industrial 
districts may resort to labour supply pools where workers likely have the required industry-specific 
skills and share the same entrepreneurial values. On the other hand, as already discussed in section 
2.1, the wage policy induces high-powered incentives. Indeed, it is likely that during a crisis, 
employees’ efforts are strategic complements (rather than substitutes). In a local community, team 
cooperation is more intense, and the probability of collective dismissal is more likely perceived as 
endogenously determined by workers’ effort choices. Hence, to decrease the probability of firms’ 
termination in a bad economic situation, it is likely that workers operating in an industrial district 
choose to put forward more effort in response to PRP than they would in other settings.  
To test the role of industrial districts in explaining the effectiveness of our key regressor, PRP, 
we perform additional estimates, reported in Table 8. We introduce a dummy variable (Distr) that 
takes the value 1 when the firm operates in an industrial district and 0 otherwise. Then, we interact 
this variable with PRP and/or the year of the crisis (Year 2010). Interestingly, the interaction term 
PRP*Crisis*Distr shows a positive and significant impact on labour productivity for both the FE 
coefficient for the mean regression (0.175) and for the majority of conditional quantile coefficients 
(whose values range from 0.129 to 0.168). This positive influence adds to that recorded for the main 
effect of PRP and fully confirms our conjecture that incentive pay is particularly favourable for FFs 
in times of crisis. The latter is always positive and significant along the productivity distribution (for 
PRP, the quantile coefficients range from 0.097 to 0.118). By contrast, our results make it clear that 
is not the district in itself that exerts a significant effect on firm productivity in adverse times, as shown 
by the negative term Crisis*Distr, but the adoption of PRP in an industrial district. Thus, we obtain 
evidence that complements the findings of Naldi et al. (2013). According to these authors, the district 
location of FFs induces greater commitment and the achievement of higher financial performance, 
measured by returns on sales. In our case, we find that FFs facing adverse shocks may improve labour 
productivity if they operate in industrial districts and resort to specific HRM strategies that involve 
pay for performance, such as PRP. The findings above are confirmed by quantile regressions 
concerning competitiveness (Panel C of Table 8). 
As we conjectured for the fourth step of our analysis (see section 2.1) and coherently with 
previous results, the interaction term PRP*Crisis*Distr persists in being nonsignificant or even 
negative for NFFs (Table 9) and indicates that resorting to PRP in times of crisis benefits only firms 
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whose family owners and family CEOs are able to align the firm’s aims with those of the local 
community.  
Insert Tables 8 and 9 
Conclusions 
This paper focused on how corporate ownership may contribute to the dispersion of 
productivity and competitiveness across industrial structures by enlarging the gap in economic 
performances between family and nonfamily firms. Although these gaps increase in times of crisis, 
FFs may adopt specific human resource management strategies, such as incentive pay schemes (PRP), 
that help them to partially reduce these penalizations.  
Specifically, the major changes observed after the crisis consist of the greater reduction, on 
average, of labour productivity in the FF group and a general substantial sluggishness of real labour 
costs in both subsamples. As a related result, we observe that after the outbreak of the crisis, the 
distance in terms of competitiveness of FFs with respect to their NFF counterparts increased. These 
results are less clear-cut along the productivity and competitiveness distributions because they hold 
only for firms located on the median or just below the median (25th percentile).  
Second, we tested the role of performance-related pay schemes in both subsamples (FFs and 
NFFs). We verified that these schemes are efficacious in FFs (but not in NFFs), even though this 
efficacy does not increase during the crisis, as we hypothesized. However, for FFs located in 
industrial districts in which social rules prevail over formal rules, the adoption of PRP exerted 
additional positive effects during the crisis. Therefore, conditioned on the location in                                                                                                                                                                                          
industrial districts, our conjectures on positive and specific effects of PRP on FFs’ performances are 
fully confirmed. 
The different role of PRP in FFs and NFFs is a puzzling issue. The positive influence of PRP 
should be universal because in both groups of firms, these schemes may have an incentive effect in 
aligning the interests of owners with those of their employees. Instead, we have found that PRP 
schemes are useful management strategies only for FFs, which can utilize these schemes to catch up 
to NFFs. One interpretation of our result is that family business may present some advantages, 
especially when FFs feature socio-emotional value and more identity than non-kinship firms (Gómez-
Mejía et al., 2007). There may be ‘instrumental motives’ according to which the interests of other 
stakeholders, such as employees, are a tool to maximize the interests of family principals. FFs have 
a higher propensity to adopt proactive stakeholder engagement activities because they intend to 
preserve and enhance their SEW (Cennamo et al. 2012). The adoption of incentives is perceived as a 
proactive stance towards employees and a positively valued dimension of FF aims (Kellermans et al. 
2012). In addition, FFs that offer compensation linked to the enterprise’s economic performance may 
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use this wage policy to attract workers who come from a local labour market; these workers, who 
share the same cultural heritage and value system as the family CEOs and family principals as often 
occurs in the Italian industrial districts, may reveal more productive than other workers, outside the 
local community. The positive effects of PRP in boosting productivity and competitiveness could be 
amplified, as they are in our case. In sum, the efficiency-enhancing role of PRP, coupled with a 
moderate influence of these schemes on wage premiums, enables FFs to regain competitiveness and 
reduce their under-performance even under hostile pressures, such as those involved in the strong 
global crisis. 
Our study has some limitations. A first type of limitation refers to statistical information. 
Longitudinal panel data including more years would enable greater consideration of causality and the 
potential endogeneity of PRP. Another main limitation concerns the lack of detailed statistical 
information on different types of PRP schemes, at the group and individual levels. In addition, 
psychometric instruments should be useful to measure SEW dimensions. Unfortunately, the RIL 
employer and employee surveys do not have data that permit consideration of these relevant issues. 
A second type of limitation concerns theory. Although some work has been done, there is no unique 
formal and corroborated theory that offers clear predictions about the specific impact of the 
compensation strategies of family and non-family business in times of crisis.  
Although our study basically remains an exploratory analysis, it offers contributions to two 
different lines of research. First, it adds evidence to the literature on FFs and to the field based on the 
SEW framework by providing results on the role of incentive payments to employees as a response 
to mitigate the crisis effect, an area quite unexplored to date. Second, it enriches the literature on 
heterogeneity and the dispersion of productivity across firms by showing the role played by FFs, 
particularly in times of crisis, and suggesting the importance of removing a “distorted homogeneous 
view” of family firms (Chua et al., 2012).  
The topic of our paper, which has been overlooked in the related literature, also has managerial 
implications. Although Italy appears to be special case in Europe due to the prevalence of family-
owned and family-managed firms, there are similarities in terms of two-tier bargaining systems in 
this country and other Continental EU countries. These similarities suggest that it could be interesting 
to explore whether the relationships between PRP and competitiveness also hold for other EU 
countries, especially those characterized by ownership concentration in family hands. 
Concerning political implications, we suggest that for an economy characterized by the 
prevalence of small family businesses, which show a low propensity to rely on formalized recruitment 
systems and performance appraisals, the implementation of wage incentive schemes calls for new 
encouragement and economic stimulus to enhance their diffusion. After the severe effects of the 
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global financial and economic crisis, PRP schemes requiring high costs of implementation that small 
firms cannot afford call for new political interventions to promote their diffusion. These measures 
could represent a valid response to improve enterprise results in a country characterized by one of the 
worst performances in productivity growth and competitiveness. 
 
References 
Abadie, A. J. Angrist, and G. Imbens (2002). ‘Instrumental Variables Estimates of the 
Effect of Subsidized Training on the Quantiles of Trainee Earnings’, Econometrica, 70 (1), 91-
117.  
 
Amemiya, T. (1982). Two stage least absolute deviations estimators. Econometrica, 50, 
689-711. 
 
Anderson, R. C., and Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm 
performance: Evidence from the S&P500. Journal of Finance, 58(3), 1301–1328.  
 
Arias, O., K. Hallock, and W. Sosa-Escudero (2001). Individual Heterogeneity in the 
Returns to Schooling: Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression Using Twins Data, Empirical 
Economics 26(1), 7–40. 
 
Arrègle, J.-L., Hitt, M., Sirmon, D., and Véry, P. (2007). The development of organizational 
social capital: Attributes of family ﬁrms. Journal of Management Studies, 44(1), 73–95. 
 
Barbera, F., and K. Moores (2013). ‘Firm Ownership and Productivity: A Study of Family 
and Non Family SMEs,’ Small Business Economics, 40, 953–976. 
 
Barth, E., Gulbrandsen, T., and Schønea, P. (2005). Family ownership and productivity: 
The role of owner-management. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(1), 107-127. 
 
Bassanini, A., Breda, T., Caroli, E., and Reberioux, A. (2013). Working in family firms: 
Paid less but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data. Industrial 
& Labor Relations Review, 66, 433–466. 
 
Bauweraerts, J. (2013). How Do Private Family Firms Face the Crisis? Empirical 
Evidence from Belgium. International Business Research, 6(8), 91. 
Becattini, G. (1990). The Marshallian industrial district as a socio-economic notion. In F. 
Pyke, G. Becattini and  W. Sengenberger (Eds.), Industrial district and inter-firm cooperation in 
Italy (pp. 37–51). Geneva:International Institute for Labour Studies. 
Becattini, G. (2002). From Marshall’s to the Italian “Industrial districts”. A brief critical 
reconstruction. In Complexity and industrial clusters (pp. 83-106). Physica-Verlag HD. 
Becker, M. C. (2004). Organizational routines: a review of the literature. Industrial and 
corporate change, 13(4), 643-678. 
 
Bennedsen, M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., & Wolfenzon, D. (2010). The governance of family 
firms. In K.H. Baker & R. Anderson (Eds.), Corporate governance: A synthesis of theory, 
research, and practice Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 371–389. 
 29 
 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., and Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2012). Socioemotional wealth in family 
firms: Theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches, and agenda for future research. Family 
Business Review, 25(3), 258-279  
 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2014). Family-controlled firms and 
stakeholder management: A socioemotional wealth preservation perspective. The Sage handbook 
of family business, 179-195. 
 
Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar (2006). ‘The Role of Family in Family Firms,’ Journal of 
Economic Perspective 20(2), 73–96.  
 
Block, J.H. (2010). Family management, family ownership, and downsizing: Evidence 
from S&P 500 firms. Family Business Review, 23(2), 109–130. 
 
Bloom, N (2009). The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks, Econometrica 77(3), 623–685. 
 
Bloom, N. and J. Van Reenen (2007). ‘Measuring and Explaining Management Practices 
Across Firms And Countries’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 1351-1408. 
 
Bloom, N., & Van Reenen, J. (2011). Human resource management and productivity.in  
Fortin, N., Lemieux, T., Firpo, S., Ashenfelter, O., & Card, D. (eds).  Handbook of labor 
economics, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 4, 1697-1767. 
 
Boeri, T. (1996). Is job turnover countercyclical?. Journal of Labor Economics, 14(4), 603-
625. 
 
Bosio G. (2009). ‘Temporary Employment and Wage Gap with Permanent Jobs: Evidence 
from Quantile Regression’, MPRA, Paper 1605. 
 
Brusco, S. (1982). The Emilian model: productive decentralisation and social integration, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 68(2), 167–84. 
 
Bubolz, M. (2001). ‘Family as source, user, and builder of social capital’. Journal of Socio-
Economics, 30, 129–31. 
 
Bugamelli, M. et al. (2018). Productivity growth in Italy: a tale of a slow-motion change, 
Occasional Papers n.422, Bank of Italy. 
 
Cameron, C. and Trivedi, P.T. (2010), Microeconometrics Using Stata, Revised Edition, 
Texas: Statacorp LP College Station. 
 
Canay, I. (2011). A Simple Approach to Quantile Regression for Panel Data, The 
Econometrics Journal, 14 (3): 368-386. 
 
 
Caselli, F., & Gennaioli, N. (2013). Dynastic management. Economic Inquiry, 51(1), 971-996. 
 
 30 
Cennamo, C., Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez‐Mejia, L. R. (2012). Socioemotional Wealth 
and Proactive Stakeholder Engagement: Why Family‐Controlled Firms Care More About Their 
Stakeholders. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36(6), 1153-1173. 
 
Chernozhukov V. and Hansen, C. (2005), An IV Model of Quantile Treatment Effect, 
Econometrica, 73, 1, 245-261.  
 
 
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., Steier, L. P., and Rau, S. B. (2012). Sources of heterogeneity 
in family firms: An introduction. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36,  1103-1113. 
 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Cruz, C. Firfiray S. and Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (2011). Socioemotional Wealth and Human 
Resource Management (HRM) in Family-Controlled Firms, in Aparna Joshi, Hui Liao, Joseph J. 
Martocchio (ed.) Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, 30, Emerald Group 
Publishing Limited, 159 – 217 
 
Davis, J. H., Allen, M. R., and Hayes, H. D. (2010). Is blood thicker than water? A study 
of stewardship perceptions in family business. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34, 1093–
1116.  
 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., and Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. Academy of Management Review, 22, 20-47.  
 
Davis, S. J., & Haltiwanger, J. (1992). Gross job creation, gross job destruction, and 
employment reallocation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 819-863. 
 
D’Amuri, F., Fabiani, S., Sabbatini, R., Polcini, R. T., Venditti, F., Viviano, E., & Zizza, R. 
(2013). Wages and prices in Italy during the crisis: the firms’ perspective (No. 289). Bank of 
Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area 
 
D'Amuri, F., & Giorgiantionio, C. (2015). Stato dell'arte e prospettive della 
contrattazione aziendale in Italia. Diritto delle relazioni industriali, 25(2), 297-341. 
 
D'Aurizio, L., and Romano, L. (2013). Family firms and the Great Recession: out of sight, 
out of mind?. Bank of Italy, Working Papers, No. 905. 
  
Dei Ottati, G. (2017). Marshallian Industrial Districts in Italy: the end of a model or 
adaptation to the global economy?. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 42(2), 259-284. 
 
Demsetz, H., and Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership: causes and 
consequences. Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177. 
 
Devicienti, F. Naticcioni, P. and Ricci, A. (2018). Temporary employment, demand 
volatility and unions: firm-level evidence, with Paolo Naticchioni and Andrea Ricci, Industrial 
and Labor Relation Review, 71(1), 2018. 
 
 31 
Dosi, G., Grazzi, M., Tomasi, C., & Zeli, A. (2012). Turbulence underneath the big calm? 
The micro-evidence behind Italian productivity dynamics. Small Business Economics, 39(4), 
1043-1067.  
 
EIRO (1997), Flessibilità del lavoro e contrattazione aziendale, European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (EIRO), downloaded on January, 20, 2016. 
 
Firfiray, S., Larraza-Kintana, M., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2016). The labor productivity of 
family firms: a socioemotional wealth perspective,  Oxford University Press, Oxford 
(forthcoming) 
 
Frolich, M., and B. Melly (2010). Estimation of Quantile Treatment Effect with Stata, Stata 
Journal 10(3), 423–457. 
 
Frolich, M., and B. Melly (2013). Unconditional Quantile Treatment Effects Under 
Endogeneity, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 31(3), 346–357. 
 
 
Gómez-Mejía et al., (2007). Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled 
firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills, Administrative science quarterly 52(1): 106-137.  
 
Hartley, J., Jacobson, D., Klandermans, B., and van Vuuren, T. (1991). Job insecurity: 
Coping with jobs at risk. London: Sage. 
 
Kellermanns, F. W., Eddleston, K. A., Sarathy, R., and Murphy, F. (2012). Innovativeness 
in family firms: A family influence perspective. Small Business Economics, 38(1), 85-101. 
 
Koenker, R., & Bassett Jr, G. (1978). Regression quantiles. Econometrica, 46,33-50.  
 
Kräkel, M., & Nieken, P. (2015). Relative performance pay in the shadow of 
crisis. European Economic Review, 74, 244-268.  
 
Lazear, E. P. (2000). Performance pay and productivity. American Economic Review, 90, 
1346-1361. 
 
Le Breton‐Miller, L., and Miller, D. (2006). Why do some family businesses out‐compete? 
Governance, long‐term orientations, and sustainable capability. Entrepreneurship theory and 
practice, 30(6), 731-746. 
 
Lins, K. V., Volpin, P., & Wagner, H. F. (2013). Does family control matter? International 
evidence from the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Review of Financial Studies, 26(10), 2583-2619. 
 
Martikainen, M., J. Nikkinen, and S. Vahamaa (2009). ‘Production Functions and 
Productivity of Family Firms: Evidence from the S&P500,’ The Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance, 49, 295–307. 
  
Melly, B. (2005), Decomposition of differences in distribution using quantile 
regression. Labour economics, 12, 577-590. 
 
Muscio, A., and Scarpinato, M. (2007). Employment and wage dynamics in Italian industrial 
districts. Regional Studies, 41(6), 765-777. 
 32 
 
Nahapiet, J., and Ghoshal, S.(1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the 
organizational advantage, Academy of management review 23(2): 242-266. 
 
Naldi, L., Cennamo, C., Corbetta, G., and Gomez‐Mejia, L. (2013). Preserving 
socioemotional wealth in family firms: Asset or liability? The moderating role of business 
context. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37(6), 1341-1360. 
 
 
Neckebrouck, J., Schulze, W., and Zellweger, T. (2017),  Are family firms good employers?. 
Academy of Management Journal, doi:10.5465/amj.2016.0765, in press. 
 
Pittino, D., Martínez, A. B., Chirico, F., & Galván, R. S. (2018). Psychological ownership, 
knowledge sharing and entrepreneurial orientation in family firms: The moderating role of 
governance heterogeneity. Journal of Business Research, 84, 312-326. 
 
Prendergast, C. (1999). The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 37(3): 7-63. 
 
Shukla, P. P., Carney, M., & Gedajlovic, E. (2014). Economic theories of family firms. The 
Sage handbook of family business, 100-118. 
 
Sverke, M., Hellgren, J. and Näswall, K. (2002): No Security: A Meta-Analysis and Review 
of Job Insecurity and Its Consequences. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 7, 242—
264.  
 
Teece, D. J., Rumelt, R., Dosi, G., and Winter, S. (1994).Understanding corporate 
coherence: Theory and evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 23(1), 1–30. 
 
Westhead, P., and Howorth, C. (2006). Ownership and management issues associated with 
family firm performance and company objectives. Family Business Review, 19(4), 301-316. 
 
Wooldrige, J.M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. 
Cambridge:MA: MIT Press. 
Zwick, T. (2004), “Employee participation and productivity”, Labour Economics, 11, 715– 
740. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics  
 Total Sample Family Firms  Non-Family Firms 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
 Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev 
             
PRP 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 
Ln (P/L) 10.85 0.55 10.81 0.55 10.80 0.51 10.75 0.52 11.02 0.64 11.00 0.59 
Ln(LC/L) 10.42 0.37 10.42 0.37 10.37 0.35 10.37 0.36 10.55 0.41 10.56 0.36 
Ln(P/LC) 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.43 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.47 0.48 0.44 0.44 
Ln(K/L) 9.99 1.52 10.22 1.71 9.98 1.45 10.24 1.65 10.05 1.73 10.18 1.89 
Workforce caracteristics             
% new hirings 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.09 0.13 
% executives 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.14 
% white collars 0.38 0.30 0.39 0.29 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.29 0.47 0.30 0.48 0.30 
% blue collars 0.58 0.33 0.56 0.32 0.62 0.31 0.60 0.30 0.44 0.35 0.43 0.35 
% women 0.34 0.28 0.35 0.27 0.33 0.28 0.34 0.27 0.36 0.26 0.37 0.26 
% fixed term contracts 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.12 
% trained workers 0.22 0.34 0.27 0.37 0.20 0.33 0.25 0.36 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.38 
Firms characteristics              
Process innov 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50 
Product innov 0.57 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.50 0.50 
Export 0.20 0.40 0.34 0.47 0.20 0.40 0.35 0.48 0.21 0.41 0.31 0.46 
Size: 5 <  n of employees<15 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.24 0.43 0.26 0.44 
Size: 15 ≦n employees < 50 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48 
Size: 50 ≦ n employees < 250 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 
Size: n of employees ≧250 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 
Regions (NUTS1)             
North West 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.38 0.49 
North East 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 
Centre 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
South 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 
Sectors             
Textile, Wearing Apparel, Food 
Industry 
0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.30 
Other Manufacturing, Mining, Utilities 0.33 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.33 0.47 
Constructions 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 
Trade, hotels, restaurants 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.09 0.29 
Transportation and communication 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30 
Intermediation and other business 
service 
0.09 0.29 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 0.23 0.42 
Education, health and private social 
services 
0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.30 0.18 0.38 0.10 0.30 
             
Observations 4476 4336 3473 3401 983 918            
  
Sorce: RIL-AIDA data; Note: descriptive statistics are performed with no sampling weights   
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 Table 2 Between and within variation of outcome variables and PRP 
Family Firms Non-Family Firms 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Observations  Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Ln (P/L) overall 10.779 0.516 N =    4312  Ln (P/L) overall 11.014 0.618 N =    1343 
 between  0.428 n =    2774  between  0.415 n =     806  
 within  0.180 T-bar = 1.55443  within  0.209 T-bar = 1.66625 
Ln(LC/L) overall 10.373 0.348 N =    4312  Ln(LC/L) overall 10.555 0.389 N =    1343 
 between  0.222 n =    2774  between  0.260 n =     806  
 within  0.120 T-bar = 1.55443  within  0.139 T-bar = 1.66625 
Ln(P/LC) overall 0.407 0.356 N =    4312  Ln(P/LC) overall 0.459 0.463 N =    1343 
 between  0.217 n =    2774  between  0.303 n =     806  
 within  0.137 T-bar = 1.55443  within  0.164 T-bar = 1.66625 
PRP overall 0.104 0.306 N =    4243  PRP overall 0.272 0.445 N =    1319 
 between  0.274 n =    2751  between  0.366 n =     800  
 within  0.125 T-bar = 1.54235  within  0.183 T-bar = 1.64875 
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Table 3 OLS and Quantile Regressions: Family firms and Labor Productivity 
 Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Family firms -0.085*** -0.085*** -0.093*** -0.146*** -0.214*** -0.118*** 
 (0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.027) (0.043) (0.024) 
Crisis (Year 2010) -0.026 -0.018 -0.021 -0.072** -0.042 -0.040* 
 (0.047) (0.028) (0.036) (0.034) (0.064) (0.024) 
Family firms* Crisis  -0.061 -0.052* -0.069** -0.04 -0.05 -0.069*** 
 (0.055) (0.031) (0.034) (0.036) (0.069) (0.026) 
Ln(K/L) 0.075*** 0.093*** 0.109*** 0.123*** 0.142*** 0.115*** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
% new hirings 0.001 0.014 0.041 0.052 0.026 0.032 
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.045) (0.050) (0.102) (0.052) 
% white collars -0.499*** -0.709*** -1.083*** -1.084*** -1.289*** -0.955*** 
 (0.137) (0.145) (0.125) (0.142) (0.229) (0.137) 
% blue collars -0.826*** -1.075*** -1.489*** -1.614*** -1.965*** -1.418*** 
 (0.132) (0.136) (0.117) (0.134) (0.219) (0.132) 
% women -0.442*** -0.441*** -0.417*** -0.338*** -0.292*** -0.396*** 
 (0.050) (0.034) (0.036) (0.037) (0.049) (0.036) 
% fixed-term contracts -0.03 -0.110* -0.082 -0.014 0.177* 0.013 
 (0.077) (0.060) (0.053) (0.066) (0.106) (0.061) 
% trained workers 0.102*** 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.038** 0.032 0.055*** 
 (0.031) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.026) (0.020) 
Process innovation 0.039* 0.016 0.005 -0.013 0.016 0.008 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.033) (0.016) 
Product innovation 0.018 0.015 0.005 -0.003 -0.058* -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.034) (0.016) 
Export 0.02 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.070** 0.049*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.013) (0.020) (0.029) (0.016) 
15<n of employees<100 0.111*** 0.074*** 0.014 -0.042** -0.112*** 0.002 
 (0.024) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) 
99<n of employees<250 0.167*** 0.116*** 0.053*** -0.038* -0.142*** 0.031 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) (0.021) 
n of employees>249 0.103* 0.063** 0.009 -0.097** -0.199*** -0.045 
 (0.054) (0.029) (0.035) (0.038) (0.048) (0.038) 
Constant 10.417*** 10.712*** 11.238*** 11.453*** 11.895*** 11.101*** 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.126) (0.138) (0.214) (0.151) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.154 0.166 0.177 0.197 0.215 0.279 
Observations 5308 
Notes: Clustered-Robust (OLS) and bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications (Quantile Regression) in parentheses. Workers categories: 
omitted variable % executives. Firm’s size: omitted variable 5<n of employees<16. 
Quantile coefficients for Family Firms: Q50 vs Q90 and Q10 vs Q90 are significantly different at .01 level. 
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level  
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Table 4 OLS and Quantile Regressions: Family firms and Labor Costs 
 Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Family firms -0.108*** -0.097*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.080*** -0.086*** 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) 
Crisis (Year 2010) -0.025 -0.020 -0.012 -0.017 -0.039 -0.014 
 (0.031) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.028) (0.013) 
Family firms* Crisis  0.023 0.012 -0.021 -0.017 -0.006 -0.020 
 (0.035) (0.019) (0.016) (0.021) (0.029) (0.015) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.039*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
% new hirings -0.08 -0.02 -0.003 0.007 0.002 -0.029 
 (0.057) (0.047) (0.035) (0.030) (0.076) (0.035) 
% white collars -0.527*** -0.767*** -1.032*** -1.226*** -1.266*** -0.957*** 
 (0.087) (0.103) (0.079) (0.086) (0.170) (0.104) 
% blue collars -0.843*** -1.105*** -1.369*** -1.568*** -1.636*** -1.307*** 
 (0.074) (0.098) (0.069) (0.077) (0.161) (0.100) 
% women -0.467*** -0.476*** -0.453*** -0.438*** -0.419*** -0.459*** 
 (0.032) (0.024) (0.022) (0.017) (0.028) (0.024) 
% fixed-term contracts -0.281*** -0.191*** -0.119** -0.099** 0.017 -0.108** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.047) (0.040) (0.081) (0.043) 
% trained workers 0.035** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.043*** 0.042** 0.040*** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013) 
Process innovation 0.006 -0.009 -0.018* -0.007 -0.027 -0.021** 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.010) 
Product innovation 0.021 0.01 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.009 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) 
Export 0.021 0.009 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.020** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) 
15<n of employees<100 0.114*** 0.077*** 0.050*** 0.019 -0.024 0.043*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) 
99<n of employees<250 0.195*** 0.152*** 0.098*** 0.055*** 0.01 0.102*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) (0.012) 
n of employees>249 0.170*** 0.147*** 0.114*** 0.021 -0.053* 0.063** 
 (0.034) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) (0.024) 
Constant 10.695*** 11.127*** 11.538*** 11.844*** 12.077*** 11.380*** 
 (0.098) (0.102) (0.084) (0.090) (0.181) (0.114) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.251 0.248 0.242 0.234 0.231 0.351 
Observations 5340 
Notes: Clustered-Robust (OLS) and bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications (Quantile Regression) in parentheses. Workers categories: 
omitted variable % executives. Firm’s size: omitted variable 5<n of employees<16. 
Quantile coefficients for Family Firms: Q10 vs Q50 are significantly different at .05 level. 
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level  
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Table 5  OLS and Quantile Regressions: Family firms and Competitiveness 
 Simultaneous Quantile estimates 
OLS  Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 
Family firms 0.031* 0.013 -0.017 -0.075*** -0.127*** -0.030 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.023) (0.033) (0.020) 
Crisis (Year 2010) -0.024 0.000 -0.004 -0.051 -0.043 -0.027 
 (0.030) (0.020) (0.023) (0.032) (0.055) (0.020) 
Family firms* Crisis  -0.031 -0.044** -0.050** -0.009 -0.027 -0.050** 
 (0.034) (0.019) (0.024) (0.033) (0.057) (0.021) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) 0.030*** 0.046*** 0.066*** 0.090*** 0.114*** 0.076*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
% new hirings 0.122*** 0.060* 0.036 0.064 0.063 0.064* 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.041) (0.061) (0.038) 
% white collars -0.092 -0.042 -0.005 -0.047 -0.146 -0.046 
 (0.089) (0.052) (0.052) (0.098) (0.272) (0.082) 
% blue collars -0.1 -0.098* -0.068 -0.160* -0.37 -0.158** 
 (0.088) (0.051) (0.050) (0.089) (0.253) (0.080) 
% women 0.058* 0.022 0.068*** 0.087*** 0.093** 0.064** 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.017) (0.024) (0.046) (0.028) 
% fixed-term contracts 0.023 0.061 0.083** 0.109** 0.11 0.121*** 
 (0.055) (0.043) (0.034) (0.048) (0.087) (0.043) 
% trained workers 0.029* 0.022** -0.005 0.01 0.028 0.015 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.030) (0.016) 
Process innovation 0.042*** 0.027*** 0.019* 0.024* 0.026 0.028** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) 
Product innovation 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.02 -0.041* -0.015 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.024) (0.013) 
Export 0.040** 0.020* 0.044*** 0.040** 0.066*** 0.030** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.023) (0.014) 
15<n of employees<100 0.02 -0.009 -0.031*** -0.073*** -0.140*** -0.041*** 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.030) (0.014) 
99<n of employees<250 0.021 -0.005 -0.057*** -0.115*** -0.238*** -0.071*** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.016) (0.025) (0.016) 
n of employees>249 0.036 -0.021 -0.088*** -0.139*** -0.272*** -0.110*** 
 (0.034) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.056) (0.034) 
Constant -0.273** -0.199*** -0.256*** -0.162 0.079 -0.234** 
 (0.110) (0.065) (0.055) (0.099) (0.268) (0.094) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R_2/PseudoR_2 0.030 0.050 0.080 0.111 0.146 0.119 
Observations 5308 
Notes: Clustered-Robust (OLS) and bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications (Quantile Regression) in parentheses. 
Competitiveness is measured as Ln(Labour Productivity)- Ln(Labour costs). 
Workers categories: omitted variable % executives. Firm’s size: omitted variable 5<n of employees<16. 
Quantile coefficients for Family Firms: Q10 vs Q90 and Q75 vs Q90 are significantly different at .01 level and at 0.10 level respectively. 
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level  
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Table 6 Quantile fixed effects, Family firms 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (labour productivity) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.067** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.068 
 (0.034) (0.017) (0.000) (0.017) (0.030) (0.047) 
Crisis -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.086*** -0.056*** -0.077*** -0.086*** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.013) (0.014) 
PRP*Crisis  -0.058 -0.029 -0.016*** -0.032 -0.012 -0.016 
 (0.045) (0.023) (0.002) (0.027) (0.049) (0.040) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.340*** 9.503*** 9.479*** 9.496*** 9.557*** 9.479*** 
 (0.117) (0.051) (0.000) (0.049) (0.111) (0.266) 
Pseudo R2 0.589 0.699 0.797 0.811 0.729  
N of firms 
(panels) 
2655 
N of Obs 4009 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour Costs) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.018 0.021*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.007 0.009 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.011) (0.030) 
Crisis -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.033*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) 
PRP*Crisis  -0.012 -0.020* -0.008*** -0.023** -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.017) (0.026) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.435*** 9.478*** 9.457*** 9.484*** 9.580*** 9.457*** 
 (0.048) (0.028) (0.000) (0.029) (0.060) (0.170) 
Pseudo R2 0.652 0.740 0.814 0.817 0.741  
N of firms 
(panels) 
2661 
N of Obs 4031 
Panel C Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour productivity)- Ln (Labour Costs) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.046** 0.042** 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.049* 0.052 
 (0.022) (0.017) (0.000) (0.010) (0.026) (0.037) 
Crisis -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.055*** 
 (0.012) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
PRP*Crisis  -0.013 -0.008 -0.007*** -0.024* -0.024 -0.007 
 (0.034) (0.017) (0.001) (0.015) (0.033) (0.031) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.043 0.090** 0.054*** 0.075** 0.164** 0.054 
 (0.095) (0.044) (0.000) (0.035) (0.071) (0.206) 
Pseudo R2 0.414 0.548 0.671 0.667 0.538  
N of firms 
(panels) 
2655 
N of Obs. 4009 
Notes: Robust (panel data model) and boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications (QR) in parentheses. 
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. 
Workers’ characteristics include: shares of blue, white-collars and executives; shares of fixed term contracts, 
trained workers and women. 
Firm characteristics include: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); share of new hirings; product and process 
innovation; export. 
Results for all control variables included in both labour force and firm characteristics are available upon request. 
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Table 7 Quantile fixed effects, Non-Family firms 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (labour productivity) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP -0.051 -0.019 -0.004*** 0.01 0.049 -0.004 
 (0.045) (0.017) (0.000) (0.016) (0.041) (0.060) 
Crisis -0.044 -0.022* -0.011*** 0.022 0.005 -0.011 
 (0.033) (0.012) (0.000) (0.014) (0.031) (0.030) 
PRP*Crisis  0.016 0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.029 -0.004 
 (0.059) (0.022) (0.004) (0.024) (0.061) (0.053) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.311*** 10.432*** 10.478*** 10.512*** 10.521*** 10.478*** 
 (0.193) (0.083) (0.001) (0.058) (0.158) (0.446) 
Pseudo R2 0.455 0.595 0.693 0.656 0.590  
N of firms 
(panels) 
787 
N of Obs 1232 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour Costs) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.081*** 0.061*** 0.088*** 0.081** 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.021) (0.040) 
Crisis -0.018 -0.020*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.019 0.005 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.000) (0.009) (0.018) (0.020) 
PRP*Crisis  -0.034 -0.034*** -0.040*** -0.022* -0.070** -0.04 
 (0.022) (0.012) (0.002) (0.013) (0.028) (0.034) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.322*** 10.330*** 10.339*** 10.367*** 10.519*** 10.339*** 
 (0.091) (0.035) (0.001) (0.033) (0.099) (0.287) 
Pseudo R2 0.564 0.652 0.709 0.674 0.613  
N of firms 
(panels) 
791 
N of Obs 1241 
Panel C Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour productivity)- Ln (Labour Costs) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP -0.091* -0.066** -0.061*** -0.091*** -0.081*** -0.101*** 
 (0.051) (0.026) (0.012) (0.000) (0.011) (0.025) 
Crisis -0.021 -0.001 -0.016 -0.021*** 0.017 0.017 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.012) (0.000) (0.012) (0.022) 
PRP*Crisis  0.043 0.009 0.018 0.043*** 0.027 0.033 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.018) (0.001) (0.018) (0.031) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.037 -0.131 0.05 0.037*** 0.025 0.006 
 (0.374) (0.128) (0.063) (0.001) (0.051) (0.126) 
Pseudo R2 0.393 0.514 0.612 0.558 0.472  
N of firms 
(panels) 
787 
N of Obs. 1232 
Notes: Robust (panel data model) and boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications (QR) in parentheses. 
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. 
Workers’ characteristics include: shares of blue, white-collars and executives; shares of fixed term contracts, 
trained workers and women. 
Firm characteristics include: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); share of new hirings; product and process 
innovation; export. 
Results for all control variables included in both labour force and firm characteristics are available upon request. 
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Table 8 Quantile fixed effects, Family firms and industrial districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (labour productivity) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.118*** 0.105* 
 (0.036) (0.027) (0.000) (0.020) (0.034) (0.063) 
PRP*Crisis -0.130*** -0.087**  -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.083 -0.101* 
 (0.050) (0.034) (0.001) (0.027) (0.055) (0.057) 
PRP*Distr -0.066 -0.061*   -0.058*** -0.031 -0.055 -0.058 
 (0.094) (0.035) (0.004) (0.031) (0.070) (0.113) 
PRP* Crisis *Distr 0.166 0.135*** 0.168*** 0.129*** 0.164*   0.175** 
 (0.113) (0.042) (0.015) (0.041) (0.098) (0.084) 
Distr* Crisis -0.099*** -0.049*** -0.053*** -0.032*** -0.062*** -0.053** 
 (0.027) (0.015) (0.000) (0.012) (0.023) (0.024) 
Crisis (Year2010) -0.060*** -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.042*** -0.056*** -0.066*** 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.000) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) 
Constant 9.325*** 9.489*** 9.455*** 9.480*** 9.480*** 9.455*** 
 (0.087) (0.053) (0.000) (0.052) (0.052) (0.304) 
Pseudo R2 0.589 0.699 0.797 0.811 0.729  
N of firms (panels) 2655 
N of Obs 4009 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour Costs) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.037*   0.034*** 0.031*** 0.025*** 0.014 0.031 
 (0.021) (0.012) (0.001) (0.009) (0.021) (0.041) 
PRP*Crisis -0.061*   -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.027*   -0.003 -0.049 
 (0.036) (0.016) (0.002) (0.014) (0.026) (0.037) 
PRP*Distr -0.028 -0.031**  -0.044*** -0.007 -0.014 -0.044 
 (0.025) (0.014) (0.005) (0.009) (0.021) (0.063) 
PRP* Crisis *Distr 0.075*   0.044**  0.081*** 0.011 -0.002 0.081 
 (0.040) (0.020) (0.007) (0.017) (0.033) (0.052) 
Distr* Crisis -0.018 -0.018**  -0.029*** -0.014**  -0.007 -0.029* 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017) 
Crisis (Year2010) -0.038*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.010*   -0.019*   -0.023** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 9.427*** 9.492*** 9.448*** 9.478*** 9.565*** 9.448*** 
 (0.044) (0.027) (0.005) (0.027) (0.056) (0.170) 
Pseudo R2 0.652 0.740 0.814 0.817 0.741  
N of firms (panels) 2661 
N of Obs 4031 
Panel C Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour productivity)- Ln (Labour Costs) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.068**  0.078*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.033 0.062 
 (0.029) (0.019) (0.003) (0.010) (0.030) (0.050) 
PRP*Crisis -0.097*   -0.062*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.022 -0.053 
 (0.050) (0.021) (0.001) (0.018) (0.048) (0.045) 
PRP*Distr -0.014 -0.047**  -0.003 0.016 0.082 -0.003 
 (0.050) (0.023) (0.002) (0.021) (0.055) (0.075) 
PRP* Crisis *Distr 0.134*   0.098*** 0.088*** 0.082**  -0.028 0.096 
 (0.074) (0.029) (0.011) (0.033) (0.081) (0.063) 
Distr* Crisis -0.048*   -0.025**  -0.023*** -0.020**  -0.016 -0.023 
 (0.025) (0.011) (0.002) (0.010) (0.022) (0.020) 
Crisis (Year2010) -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.018**  -0.027**  -0.045*** 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) 
Constant -0.081 0.067 0.037*** 0.053*   0.138*   0.037 
 (0.093) (0.044) (0.002) (0.030) (0.076) (0.205) 
Pseudo R2 0.414 0.548 0.671 0.667 0.538  
N of firms (panels) 2655 
N of Obs. 4009 
Notes: Robust (panel data model) and boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications (QR) in parentheses. 
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level.  
Both firm and workers characteristics included as control variables (see Table 5) 
Results for all control variables included in both labour force and firm characteristics are available upon request.  
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Table 9 Quantile fixed effects, Non-Family firms and industrial districts 
 
 42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (labour productivity) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP -0.065 -0.007 -0.011*** 0.03 -0.003 -0.011 
 (0.062) (0.023) (0.004) (0.019) (0.048) (0.081) 
PRP*Crisis 0.152**  0.029 0.054*** -0.002 0.066 0.054 
 (0.071) (0.028) (0.009) (0.035) (0.080) (0.065) 
PRP*Distr 0.018 -0.047 -0.017*** -0.062**  0.041 -0.017 
 (0.076) (0.031) (0.003) (0.028) (0.070) (0.125) 
PRP* Crisis *Distr -0.253**  -0.087*   -0.114*** -0.013 -0.180*   -0.114 
 (0.116) (0.050) (0.015) (0.048) (0.106) (0.114) 
Distr* Crisis 0.038 -0.046*   -0.046*** -0.061**  -0.035 -0.046 
 (0.064) (0.025) (0.001) (0.026) (0.057) (0.060) 
Crisis (Year2010) -0.063*   0.007 0.005*** 0.047**  0.015 0.005 
 (0.038) (0.019) (0.002) (0.020) (0.041) (0.035) 
Constant 10.411*** 10.519*** 10.525*** 10.546*** 10.558*** 10.525*** 
 (0.181) (0.071) (0.001) (0.058) (0.181) (0.449) 
Pseudo R2       
N of firms 
(panels) 
787 
N of Obs 1232 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour Costs) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP 0.069*** 0.074*** 0.081*** 0.061*** 0.082*** 0.081 
 (0.020) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) (0.026) (0.053) 
PRP*Crisis 0.002 -0.022 -0.020*** -0.011 -0.059 -0.02 
 (0.031) (0.018) (0.004) (0.018) (0.037) (0.043) 
PRP*Distr -0.045 -0.035**  -0.019*** -0.01 -0.008 -0.019 
 (0.032) (0.016) (0.003) (0.016) (0.055) (0.082) 
PRP* Crisis *Distr -0.048 -0.021 -0.038*** -0.027 -0.024 -0.038 
 (0.048) (0.026) (0.005) (0.026) (0.080) (0.075) 
Distr* Crisis 0.006 0.001 -0.017*** -0.008 -0.007 -0.017 
 (0.029) (0.012) (0.002) (0.014) (0.034) (0.040) 
Crisis (Year2010) -0.033*   -0.021**  0.011*** 0.002 0.022 0.011 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.002) (0.010) (0.021) (0.023) 
Constant 10.311*** 10.355*** 10.353*** 10.366*** 10.499*** 10.353*** 
 (0.075) (0.035) (0.004) (0.036) (0.098) (0.291) 
Pseudo R2       
N of firms 
(panels) 
791 
N of Obs 1241 
Panel C Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour productivity)- Ln (Labour Costs) 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 FE 
PRP -0.058 -0.054*** -0.102*** -0.079*** -0.127*** -0.102 
 (0.049) (0.018) (0.003) (0.014) (0.033) (0.068) 
PRP*Crisis 0.039 0.035 0.082*** 0.032 0.075**  0.082 
 (0.061) (0.026) (0.004) (0.024) (0.036) (0.055) 
PRP*Distr -0.022 -0.034 0.010*** -0.008 0.022 0.01 
 (0.059) (0.025) (0.003) (0.021) (0.049) (0.105) 
PRP* Crisis *Distr -0.045 -0.03 -0.074*** -0.021 -0.027 -0.083 
 (0.086) (0.041) (0.010) (0.038) (0.067) (0.096) 
Distr* Crisis -0.031 -0.032 -0.021*** -0.054**  -0.068 -0.021 
 (0.053) (0.025) (0.003) (0.021) (0.044) (0.051) 
Crisis (Year2010) 0.016 -0.002 -0.013*** 0.038**  0.028 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.019) (0.001) (0.015) (0.025) (0.029) 
Constant -0.028 0.076 0.066*** 0.022 0.043 0.066 
 (0.150) (0.061) (0.003) (0.050) (0.122) (0.378) 
Pseudo R2       
N of firms 
(panels) 
787 
N of Obs. 1232 
Notes: Robust (panel data model) and boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications (QR) in parentheses. 
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. 
Both firm and workers characteristics included as control variables (see Table 5) 
Results for all control variables included in both labour force and firm characteristics are available upon request. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 Description of the Variables 
Variable Definition 
PRP 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopts a PRP scheme, 0 
otherwise. 
FF 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is owned and or controlled 
by a family  (FF) and 0 otherwise (NFF) 
 Ln (P) 
Log of value-added per employee (source AIDA) deflated by the value 
added deflator (source ISTAT) 
 Ln (LC/L) 
Log of Labour cost per employee (source AIDA) deflated by the 
consumer price index for blue and white collar workers (source 
ISTAT) 
Ln (P/LC) Proxy of competitiveness of the firms 
Ln (K/L) 
Log of capital stock per employee (source AIDA) deflated by the 
investment deflator (source ISTAT) 
% executives  Percentage of managers and supervisors on total workers 
% white collars  Percentage of white collar workers on total workers 
% blue collars  Percentage of manual workers on total workers 
% females  Percentage of women on total workers 
% fixed-term contracts  Percentage of fixed-term workers on total workers 
% new hirings  Number of hired workers on total workers in the previous year 
% trained workers  Percentage of trained workers on total workers 
Process Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm adopted process innovations 
in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Product Innovation 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm originated new products in 
the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Foreign market 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm exported in the last three 
years, 0 otherwise 
North- West 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in North-Western 
regions, 0 otherwise 
North-East 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in North-Eastern 
regions, 0 otherwise 
Centre 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Central 
regions, 0 otherwise 
South 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in Southern 
regions, 0 otherwise 
Industrial Districts (Distr) 
Dummy variables that equals 1 if the firm is localised in an industrial 
district as defined by Istat (2001). 
Sectors 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is localised in sector shown 
in table1, 0 otherwise 
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Table A.2 Restructuring of labour forces during the crisis in family and non-family firms (OLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Log (Labour Costs) Log(Employees) 
Net Employment 
Growth 
Family firms -0.164*** -0.078*** -0.036*** 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.010) 
Crisis (Year 2010) -0.015 -0.003 0.009 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) 
Family firms* Crisis -0.013 0.009 0.138*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 13.775*** 2.398*** 0.095** 
 
(0.138) (0.102) (0.045) 
N of Obs 5291 5291 4855 
R2 0.831 0.841 0.52 
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Table A.3 IV Quantile Regressions: Effects of PRP on Productivity, Labour Costs and Competitiveness in Family 
Firms 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (labour productivity) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 = 
PRP 0.427*** 0.323*** 0.226* 0.279*** 0.404** 0.513*** 
 (0.084) (0.083) (0.130) (0.094) (0.194) (0.072) 
Crisis(Year2010) -0.095 -0.009 -0.014 -0.002 -0.002 -0.151*** 
 (0.205) (0.112) (0.103) (0.126) (0.178) (0.018) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 9.437*** 9.764*** 10.250*** 10.563*** 10.129*** 11.085*** 
 (1.015) (1.071) (1.319) (1.372) (1.927) (0.191) 
Pseudo R2      0.179 
N of Obs 2441 2372 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour Costs) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 = 
PRP 0.253*** 0.245*** 0.203*** 0.244*** 0.285*** 0.133*** 
 (0.095) (0.080) (0.060) (0.085) (0.087) (0.044) 
Crisis(Year2010) 0.041 0.067 0.050 0.040 0.044 -0.036*** 
 (0.123) (0.093) (0.086) (0.099) (0.106) (0.013) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.477*** 10.433*** 10.667*** 11.022*** 11.185*** 11.397*** 
 (0.485) (1.664) (0.927) (1.159) (1.324) (0.111) 
Pseudo R2      0.229 
N of Obs 2454 2383 
Panel C Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour productivity)- Ln (Labour Costs) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 = 
PRP 0.501*** 0.349** 0.324** 0.399*** 0.433** 0.300*** 
 (0.172) (0.139) (0.130) (0.117) (0.178) (0.058) 
Crisis(Year2010) -0.085 -0.064 -0.077 -0.100 -0.105 -0.095*** 
 (0.141) (0.126) (0.109) (0.107) (0.200) (0.016) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -2.300*** -1.947* -1.255 -1.385 -1.359 -0.23 
 (0.883) (1.043) (1.631) (2.025) (1.913) (0.140) 
Pseudo R2      0.100 
N of Obs. 2441 2372 
Notes: IVQR_AAI is the Quantile Treatment Effect Estimator of Abadie et al. (2002); IV_2LAD is the 
traditional Two-Stages Least Absolute Deviation Estimator of Amemya (1982). 
Workers’ characteristics include: shares of blue, white-collars and executives; shares of fixed term contracts, trained 
workers and women.  
Firm characteristics include: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); share of new hirings; product and process 
innovation; export. 
Results for all control variables included in both labour force and firm characteristics are available upon request. 
.*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level.  
Boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications in parentheses. 
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Table A.4 IV Quantile Regressions: Effects of PRP on Productivity, Labour Costs and Competitiveness in Non-
Family Firms 
 Panel A Dep. Var. : Ln (labour productivity) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 = 
PRP 0.231 0.199 0.180 0.152 0.151 0.809*** 
 (0.251) (0.136) (0.151) (0.135) (0.247) (0.207) 
Crisis(Year2010) -0.033 -0.018 0.024 0.014 -0.084 -0.051 
 (0.253) (0.116) (0.142) (0.163) (0.250) (0.040) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 10.573*** 12.048*** 12.228*** 11.706*** 11.044*** 13.633*** 
 (0.935) (0.605) (1.037) (1.258) (1.290) (0.446) 
Pseudo R2      0.213 
N of Obs 2441 746 
Panel B  Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour Costs) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 = 
PRP 0.260 0.215* 0.175** 0.111 0.068 0.364*** 
 (0.182) (0.122) (0.074) (0.086) (0.099) (0.122) 
Crisis(Year2010) 0.067 0.032 0.029 0.021 0.038 -0.006 
 (0.122) (0.074) (0.055) (0.050) (0.092) (0.019) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 11.616*** 11.761*** 11.787*** 12.295*** 12.302*** 12.619*** 
 (0.564) (0.443) (0.372) (1.034) (1.276) (0.233) 
Pseudo R2      0.275 
N of Obs 2454 749 
Panel C Dep. Var. : Ln (Labour productivity)- Ln (Labour Costs) 
 IVQR_AAI IV_2LAD 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 = 
PRP 0.287 0.174 0.156 0.124 0.075 0.471*** 
 (0.218) (0.151) (0.115) (0.120) (0.189) (0.181) 
Crisis(Year2010) -0.025 0.013 -0.041 0.007 -0.022 -0.038 
 (0.109) (0.094) (0.087) (0.111) (0.232) (0.029) 
Work.Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Charact. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro-regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.353 0.253 0.333 0.171 0.022 0.763** 
 (0.325) (0.671) (0.435) (0.625) (0.724) (0.310) 
Pseudo R2      0.098 
N of Obs. 2441 746 
Notes: IVQR_AAI is the Quantile Treatment Effect Estimator of Abadie et al. (2002); IV_2LAD is the 
traditional Two-Stages Least Absolute Deviation Estimator of Amemya (1982). 
Workers’ characteristics include: shares of blue, white-collars and executives; shares of fixed term contracts, trained 
workers and women.  
Firm characteristics include: firm’s size, capital intensity (Ln(K/L); share of new hirings; product and process 
innovation; export. 
Results for all control variables included in both labour force and firm characteristics are available upon request. 
.*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level.  
Boostrapped standard errors with 100 replications in parentheses. 
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Table A.5. IV Quantile Regressions 2_LAD: First Stage (Probit Model) 
Dependent Variable: PRP Family Firms Non-Family Firms 
High Sales Volatility (1/0) 0.256*** 0.176 
 (0.096) (0.136) 
Crisis(Year2010) 0.130 0.077 
 (0.083) (0.122) 
Ln(physical capital per employee) -0.296 -0.119 
 (0.346) (0.607) 
% new hirings -2.519*** -0.531 
 (0.549) (0.705) 
% white collars -2.231*** -0.137 
 (0.452) (0.678) 
% blue collars -0.461** -0.541* 
 (0.200) (0.299) 
% women -1.365*** -1.680** 
 (0.447) (0.788) 
% fixed-term contracts 0.219** 0.420*** 
 (0.093) (0.158) 
% trained workers 0.019 0.017 
 (0.030) (0.045) 
Process innovation -0.088 0.057 
 (0.101) (0.123) 
Product innovation 0.042 0.111 
 (0.117) (0.115) 
Export 0.134 -0.176 
 (0.087) (0.141) 
15<n of employees<100 0.715*** 0.704** 
 (0.140) (0.278) 
99<n of employees<250 1.232*** 1.347*** 
 (0.159) (0.290) 
n of employees>249 1.722*** 1.824*** 
 (0.308) (0.442) 
Constant -0.472 -1.682** 
 (0.512) (0.853) 
NUTS1_level Dummies Yes Yes 
Sector Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 2358 741 
Notes: bootstrapped standard errors with 100 replications in parentheses. 
*** significant at .01 level; ** significant at .05 level; *significant at .10 level. 
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APPENDIX B 
B.1 
One may formalize the Canay technique to the productivity equation as:    
  (𝛽𝜏 , γ𝜏 , δ𝜏 , 𝜽𝜏) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝜌𝜏 ∙ (𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
̂
𝑖,𝑡
− 𝛽 ∙ 𝐷𝐹𝐹,𝑖,𝑡  − γ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 −  𝛿 𝐷𝐹𝐹,𝑖,𝑡 ∙ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 − 𝜽 ∙ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡) 
where 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
̂
𝑖,𝑡
 is now a dependent variable generated from a previous step in which we calculated the individual fixed 
effects  𝛼𝑖 in a conditional mean regression (that is, a panel data structure of equation 1) and get 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
̂
𝑖,𝑡
=  𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
−
 𝛼𝑖 , by assuming that this fixed effects do not vary over quantiles. 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is a matrix including now 𝐹𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜇𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾𝑗.We also 
repeated equation (4) for labour costs (
𝐿𝐶
𝐿
̂
)
𝑖𝑡
and competitiveness l𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿𝐶
̂
)
𝑖,𝑡
. 
 
B.2 
The IVQR_AAI estimator is based on a binary endogenous variable and a binary instrument18. Thus, we transform 
the past sales volatility of the firm into a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm experienced volatility above the 
median volatility and 0 otherwise. The volatility of sales at the firm level recorded in the past (over the 1998-2005 period) 
may be a valid instrument because it is a proxy for uncertainty. As already discussed in section 2.1, the rationale is that 
unstable market conditions, captured by sales volatility, increase the probability of decentralized agreements that typically 
include PRP. This hypothesis receives support in the Italian case, where PRP is most widely adopted by Italian companies 
as a strategy for adapting their wage to variable and uncertain external pressures (see the EIRO report, 1997). However, 
using more than a one-year lag for this instrument, it is plausible to assume that it is orthogonal to labour productivity as 
well as the other two dependent variables observed years later. Thus, our instrument is expected to randomly affect sample 
firms and influence the probability that firms will introduce PRP.  
Following Abadie et al. (2002), the conditional quantile treatment effect for compliers can be estimated consistently 
by the following weighted quantile regressions: 
  (𝛽𝐼𝑉
𝜏 , 𝜹𝐼𝑉
𝜏 ) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐼 ∙ 𝜌𝜏 ∙ (𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
− 𝛽 ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡)   
                       𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐼 = 1 −
𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡∙(1−𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡)
1−𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑉=1|𝑿𝑖,𝑡)
−
(1−𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡)∙𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑉=1|𝑿𝑖,𝑡)
 
where 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 is the matrix including all control variables discussed in footnote 8, SV is the binary instrument for volatility 
of sales, and the weights 𝑊𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐼 combine the endogenous variable and the instrument. As stated above, the instrument is 
assumed to hit the sample firms randomly, and the conditional probability of having a volatility above the median, 
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑉 = 1|𝑿𝑖,𝑡), is estimated by means of a non-parametric regression, specifically, a local logit estimation, as suggested 
by Frölich and Melly (2013). 
The Abadie et al. (2002) conditional quantile treatment effects estimator (IVQR_AAI) can be applied only if both the 
endogenous variable and the instrument are binary variables. Furthermore, the causal effect is identified only for the sub-
population of compliers. In our case, the compliers are firms whose estimated probability of adopting a PRP scheme is 
correlated with a higher estimated probability of having experienced a value of past volatility of sales above the median. 
In our sample, these compliers are approximately 72% of all firms that adopt PRP.  
 
 
                                                 
18 The binary nature of our key explanatory variable (PRP) leads us to address endogeneity via treatment effect 
techniques. As discussed below, under the instrumental variable quantile method used in our estimates, we compare 
the performance of both treated firms (firms adopting PRP schemes) and the control group (firms not adopting PRP 
schemes) to undertake a counterfactual analysis. 
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B.3 
The IVQR_2 LAD estimator involves using the fitted values obtained from a regression performed in a first step and 
then inserting the fitted values for PRP as a covariate to yield the IVQR_2 LAD estimator of 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
, 𝑙𝑛 (
𝐿𝐶
𝐿
)
𝑖,𝑡
 and  
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃
𝐿𝐶
)
𝑖,𝑡
 in a second step. In our case, as noted above, the first step is a probit regression of PRP (our endogenous binary 
variable) on the binary instrument (sales volatility, SV) at the firm level.  
Formally the probit regression reads as :  𝑃(𝑃𝑅𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑿𝒊,𝒕) = 𝚽(𝝃 ∙ 𝑆𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜹 ∙ 𝑿𝑖,𝑡), where SV is the binary 
instrument for the volatility of sales and  𝑿𝑖,𝑡 are the firm-level controls mentioned above. 
 To obtain consistent standard errors, we bootstrap them in both the first-stage and second-stage regressions 
(Arias et al. 2001; Bosio, 2009). Notice, however, that this approach relies on the symmetry of the composite error 
obtained in the second stage (see Wooldridge, 2010). Furthermore, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) show that this 
estimate is not consistent when the coefficients differ across quantiles, and it is precisely in this case that the quantile 
regression method is of interest (see also Melly, 2005 and Bosio, 2009). For this reason, we retain the IVQR_2 LAD 
estimator only as an IV conditional median estimator that permits us to show the significance of the instrument (sales 
volatility) in the first stage19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 For instruments to be valid, orthogonality conditions must be met. With regard to this second property, we have only 
one instrument and one endogenous variable, so the equation is perfectly identified; no test is available to prove the 
orthogonality condition. According to the authors who propose the methods discussed above (Abadie et al., 
2002; Frölich and Melly, 2010; 2013), instrument-error independence is plausible when the random assignment of the 
instrument can be plausibly justified. In our case, the standard deviation of sales is strictly related to uncertainty (Bloom, 
2009). Conceivably, this volatility is randomly assigned to firms. 
